How does drone power expand Turkey’s regional competition?

Over the past few years, Turkey has taken long steps to develop the production capacity of military and civilian unmanned aerial vehicles, and Baykar Defense is at the center of the industry. Since coming to power in 2002, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has dreamed of turning Turkey into a regional power. The country has increased its military presence in the absence of other actors in the region, including Syria, Iraq, Libya and, more recently, Karabakh, through cooperation with Azerbaijan.

At the same time, participation in numerous regional wars has led to an increase in field activities to test Turkey’s domestically produced weapons on the battlefield and to improve their capabilities. Turkey now claims that the demand for its military drones has increased significantly due to the competitiveness of its drones with similar products from other countries, and that its ally Azerbaijan, Poland, Ukraine, Qatar and Tunisia are among the applicants.

In addition to export earnings, drones are being used to influence Erdogan to compete with a number of regional rivals, helping the public show that the country is moving away from the West’s dependence on arms supplies.

But these sales have led to increased sensitivity of other actors and even tensions with rivals. The export of drones to Ukraine has recently sparked tensions between Moscow and Ankara, already rivals in the Syrian-Libyan conflict.

Last week, the Ukrainian army’s attack on Russian-backed Donbass separatists using a Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 showed that the Ukrainian armed forces had new potential to maintain a balance of power.

A few months after the meeting between Erdogan and his Ukrainian counterpart Vladimir Zelensky, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Thursday that he was concerned about the sale of Turkish drones to Ukraine. We have good and special relations with Turkey. But there is no doubt that the use of Turkish drones by the Ukrainian army will have negative consequences.

Ukraine is not the only buyer. Two weeks ago, Erdogan traveled to Africa and signed arms deals with countries in the region, including fighter jets.

Ahead of his visit to Angola, the Turkish leader told reporters that Turkey is on its way to becoming Africa’s leading trading partner. This means that Turkey is on the way to becoming more involved in other conflicts and crises in Africa in competition with other international and regional powers. Bayraktar’s TB2 sale to Morocco and Ethiopia was an important news on Erdogan’s Africa tour.

Morocco reportedly received 13 TB-2 drones and an indefinite number of launch sites for delivery in April. According to local media, Rabat made the purchases under a $ 70 million contract with Baykar, Turkey’s leading drone manufacturer, led by Erdogan’s son-in-law.

On October 14, Reuters reported that Ethiopia was also buying an indefinite number of Turkish drones, although neither Turkey nor Ethiopian officials had yet explicitly ratified the agreement.

For Turkey, sales to African countries after signing agreements with allies such as Ukraine, Qatar and Azerbaijan are another point in the successful drone export chain. However, if the deal is completed, Turkey will face widespread regional competition in North and East Africa, given growing concerns about the use of drones in conflicts such as the Tigray War, in which actors such as Ethiopia, Morocco and the UAE are involved. . So far, Ethiopia has relied on its air force to strike rebels in the Tigray region.

On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that Ethiopia also has a serious dispute with Egypt and Sudan over the dam on the Nile, and the Egyptians no doubt see Turkey’s sale of military weapons to Ethiopia as a blow to their interests. , something is even slowing down the already slow Turkish-Egyptian de-escalation efforts.

It is unclear how the Turkish drone deal with Ethiopia could hurt efforts to restore relations with Egypt. Following a visit by an Ethiopian delegation to Ankara in the summer, Erdogan offered to mediate a dispute between the two over the construction of the Greater Ethiopian Renaissance Warehouse (GERD). This came at a time when diplomatic movements were slowly moving toward normalization of relations between Turks and Egyptians.

Similarly, Morocco is expected to become a major drone force in North Africa with the help of Turkey. Rabat still uses platforms supplied by the United States, China and Israel, but these observation platforms are thought to be unarmed. However, following a mysterious airstrike in the disputed West Sahara region on April 8, speculation has increased that Morocco may acquire armed drones.

For ten years, Morocco has been battling a separatist group called the Polisario Front, which seeks independence from Western Sahara from Rabat. After decades of silence, the rebel group has announced that it will resume war on Moroccan security forces in November 2020.

Although Turkey seeks a diplomatic solution to the conflict in its official positions, it appears to want to sell drones as part of its efforts to gain regional influence.

Unlike other parts of Africa, where Turkey’s interests revolve around trade and soft power, Ankara is involved in geopolitical competition in North and East Africa, where strong military power is key.

Turkey is competing for influence with rivals such as the UAE, Russia and France and is looking for potential partners. Erdogan previously had good relations with the former Islamist governments of Egypt and Sudan, but both were overthrown in a coup by Ankara’s rivals.

Since then, Erdogan has used his military might in Libya, another rivalry, to rescue his allies in Tripoli, as well as a Turkish military base in Somalia.

Although Ankara is trying to reduce competition with its allies in Egypt and the Persian Gulf, there are signs that Turkey’s sale of drones could pose a problem for re-establishing ties with the Arab monarchies.

As for Morocco, Ankara’s relations with Rabat are weaker than those of rival Algeria. The two African states have been at loggerheads over Western Sahara since gaining independence from French colonial rule in 1960, accusing each other of meddling in each other’s affairs.

Tensions between Algeria and Morocco broke again in late August when they cut diplomatic ties. Immediately after the move, Algeria closed its airspace to Moroccan aircraft and refused to extend a contract to supply gas to a pipeline built by Morocco to transport gas to Europe.

As the fourth largest energy supplier to Turkey and a diplomatic ally in Libya, Algeria is an important partner. Although the Turkish state media has reduced the impact of the sale of drones to Morocco on Turkish-Algerian relations, Turkey’s ambiguous position on the Western Sahara is beginning to attract attention in Algeria. With the possibility of escalating tensions between Rabat and the Polisario Front, any role of Turkish-supplied drones in the clashes could pose a problem for Ankara’s relations with Algeria.