Pakistan in crisis: How safe are its nuclear weapons?

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The events of May 9 in Pakistan were unprecedented. Huge mobs protesting the arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan attacked and vandalized army establishments and government buildings. The ransacking of the most visible and sacred symbol of the Pakistan Army, the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, signaled a breakdown, albeit temporary, of the security machinery. The situation could have turned disastrous as there were rumors that some senior commanders refused to obey Army Chief General Asim Munir’s order. Apart from other consequences of this chaos, there are also serious questions being raised about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

The events and their aftermath reinforced Pakistan’s unstable and fragile security environment. There were reports of resignations and mass dismissals of senior army officers at corps commander level after the May 9 uprising. The Lahore Corps chief was removed and many senior officers have reportedly resigned. A Pakistan Army spokesperson came on a news channel to dispel rumors of layoffs and resignations. The divisions within Pakistan’s military that emerged during and after the crisis do not bode well, particularly for the country’s nuclear safeguards.

Security concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have worried the international community for a long time. Among other threatening scenarios, the fear of rogue or disaffected actors in the military gaining control of these weapons has been a constant concern. Experts have long argued that insider-jihad collaboration poses the most serious threat to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The brazen attacks on Mehran Naval Base in 2011, Kamra Air Force Base in 2012 and PNS Zulfiqar in 2014 were glaring examples of insider-jihadi collaborations. The ever-looming possibility of these two potentially dangerous elements coming together and acquiring a nuclear weapon is perhaps one of the most underestimated threats to international peace and security.

Pakistan claims its nuclear security is foolproof. Given the country’s complete non-transparency in sharing all nuclear security details, primary source materials detailing Islamabad’s nuclear security measures are sparse. Yet work by independent nuclear watchdogs such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the Arms Control Association provides a fair account of its nuclear safeguards.

Pakistan claims to have a robust Personal Reliability Program (PRP), which evaluates the suitability of personnel assigned to the security of its nuclear installations and storage sites. The PRP is said to be designed to identify extremist sympathizers and spy agents within Pakistan’s nuclear security human resources. Site Security is another area where Pakistan can boast of its progress. The series of attacks between 2011 and 2015 on Pakistan’s vital defense installations prompted Pakistan to increase its security at the site. The Nuclear Threat Initiative Report 2020 also found that Pakistan had significantly improved its on-site security.

On the weapons security front, Pakistan claims to have upgraded and indigenized its Tamper Indicative Devices (TIDs) used to detect physical tampering and unauthorized access. Pakistan claims to have developed its indigenous Permissive Action Links (PALs) to prevent unauthorized arming and detonation of nuclear weapons. In terms of transport security, there were reports that Pakistan, to avoid detection by enemy satellites and foreign intelligence agents, transported its nuclear material, including fissile material and warheads, in unmarked civilian vehicles with minimum security. This was potentially dangerous as it made these vehicles an easy target for terrorist attacks in the event of insider information.

However, NTI’s 2020 report indicates that Islamabad has made significant improvements in the physical security of weapons and materials in transit.

Overall, Pakistan appears to have made significant progress in its nuclear security both physical and access control, although it is difficult to independently verify these claims. Still, current safeguards for its nuclear warheads and material may not be sufficient. There are limits to what physical security measures alone can do. The vulnerability of these weapons stems more from the structural flaws in the nation’s governance mechanism, rather than inadequacies in the nuclear safeguards.

Advances in physical security and access control alone do not guarantee a robust security structure. Vulnerability arises not only from the likelihood of operational attacks on its weapons sites, but also from inherent structural deficiencies such as a fragile security environment and unstable nuclear decision-making. Pakistan’s transition to tactical nuclear weapons complicates their decision-making process. Pakistan believes that the best way to deter a conventional attack by India is to asymmetrically escalate a conflict by threatening the first use of tactical nuclear weapons on advancing Indian forces as they cross the border into Pakistani territory, thereby achieving deterrence by denial.

Pakistan is therefore forced to carry out such command and control procedures where these battlefield weapons must be under the control of theater commanders to make their first strike policy appear credible. Islamabad’s heavy tilt towards the use of tactical nuclear weapons makes the entire edifice vulnerable to organizational breakdown, giving room to rogue states in the armed forces to implement their nefarious designs. A May 9-style situation presents an opportunity for disgruntled senior or middle managers or powerful non-state actors to take advantage of the fluid situation.

Adversarial capabilities matter, but structural vulnerabilities can allow even less capable adversaries to achieve their goals. A fragile security environment reinforces organizational and decision-making vulnerabilities. Crises like the current one have the potential to threaten the unity of command in Pakistan. The reported differences within the Pak Army could seriously undermine its ability to stabilize the situation. The erosion of public trust in institutions could exacerbate the existing instability and lead to a complete collapse. It is under these circumstances that an insider rogue threat can actually materialize, rendering physical security measures pointless.

The author is a senior IPS officer and doctoral fellow at Princeton. The views are personal

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