Apple takes a step towards opening the back door

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Child sexual abuse is abhorrent. However, for many smartphone owners, the idea that the government or the police can read content on a device that is almost an extension of themselves is also disgusting. The imperatives of tackling crime and protecting privacy run counter to Apple’s decision to scan US iPhones for child abuse images. Activists will celebrate for better protection of children. But this step sets a heavy precedent.

Apple has long refused to push for a “backdoor” in code that would, in certain circumstances, allow law enforcement to access its devices. It has twice resisted FBI demands to help it unlock phones, after shootings in San Bernardino, California, in 2015, and Florida in 2019 — even though Apple said it provided data including iCloud backups. As encryption has become key to many products and services, Facebook and other tech groups have also opposed moves to allow “exceptional access”.

Encrypted devices and messages are a boon to organized crime, terrorists and child abusers. But big tech companies and privacy advocates have argued, with strong justification, that creating any kind of back door opens the way for hackers, cybercriminals or unscrupulous governments to abuse them.

Apple’s “neural matching” is not – quite – a back door, in the sense of providing direct access to content across the operating system. Furthermore, Apple already decrypts photos on its iCloud servers if required by law enforcement. The former is that its technology will now proactively display images on iPhones — smashing the circular fence that surrounded their devices — looking for a match with those in a US database of known child abuse images. Matches are flagged when photos are uploaded to iCloud and studied by reviewers and sent to law enforcement if verified.

Privacy activists warn that by allowing patterns to be matched in encrypted photos on iPhones, Apple opens itself and others to pressure from governments to do the same with other types of content, such as photos of opposition protests. Businesses can refuse, but they may face legislative moves to force it. Thousands of revelations about what appeared to be Israeli NSO’s Pegasus spyware showed that many governments are happy to use backdoor mechanisms.

Apple may hope that by cooperating with US authorities in the face of one of the most morally despicable activities that exploit digital encryption, it can block the legislation that forces it to move forward. The US, UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada have called on technology companies to include mechanisms that would enable governments – with appropriate legal authority – to access the data. The danger is that Apple will simply whet the appetite. Some competitors are particularly angry, feeling the Cupertino-based company has broken through and compromised on an important principle.

Some in the security community are speculating, though, that Apple may be preparing to offer more encryption protection around data on iCloud, which doesn’t currently exist. Providing help finding child abuse material may be a trade-off for currently reducing access to iCloud, by encrypting other data stored on it. This could provide welcome additional protection for opponents in, for example, Hong Kong. Apple and other foreign groups in recent years have had to store Chinese users’ data in a data center inside the country.

Collaboration between big tech companies and law enforcement is essential in legitimate efforts to fight crime and protect security, but “back doors” are fraught with danger. Not just its users, but billions of phone users around the world hope Apple’s move won’t be the high end of a much bigger wedge.

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