Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and the Islamic State: Western Intervention as an Index of Failure | Paul Rogers

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Although the anti-war mood deepened in the UK in 2002, when President George W. Bush moved to end the regime in Iraq, there was already some concern last October, before the Afghan war began. One political paper, which she co-authored, even argued against it, citing an inevitable escalation and danger of a never-ending war. But mostly, the defense establishment offered support.

In this case, the Taliban fell within weeks and Bush could declare, in his 2002 State of the Union address, an expanded war against the “axis of evil,” with Iraq first on the horizon. Until mid-2002, the US, UK, and others moved out of Afghanistan, leaving a dangerous security vacuum, which was filled by the resurgence of the Taliban, through many rural areas, eventually unleashing the events that culminated in the past few days.

The entire war is now seen as a fiasco, but its real significance is that it was just the first of the four failed wars. The second was the eight-year Iraq war, from 2003 to 2011, that ended with Obama withdrawing US troops. The consequences were dire, with 288,000 people killed, mostly civilians, hundreds of thousands injured, and millions displaced.

Also in 2011 was the failed Third War, the Franco-British operation to help overthrow Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. This six-month air offensive was supported by the United States and Italy and ended with Gaddafi’s execution. The anticipation was a rapid transition to a pro-Western oil-rich country, which would also be a ready market for Western arms companies. Instead, there has been a decade of deep instability and insecurity, with Libya becoming a conduit for arms transfers to the multiple jihadist groups throughout the Sahel.

Even as this crystallized, ISIS was developing in Iraq and Syria, leading to the failed fourth war: the 2014-18 air attack on ISIS led by the United States, with the United Kingdom, France and other NATO partners participating. .

ISIS arose out of the alleged ashes of al-Qaeda in Iraq after the US withdrawal in 2011 and spread with remarkable speed to form a “caliphate” of six million people across Syria and Iraq, even seeming ready to threaten Baghdad.

The Western response, with some regional support, was a classic example of the new trend toward distant warfare. Clearly, “boots on the ground” have failed in Iraq and Afghanistan, so the war has now been fought by attack aircraft, standoff weapons, armed drones, selective use of special forces and, in the case of ISIS, heavy reliance on the Kurds and the Iranian-backed. Iraqi militias.

By the end of 2018, all the territory of the ISIS caliphate had been cleared and at least this war appears to have been successful. But that now seems hollow, with conflict and instability across the Sahel and beyond, from Mauritania, through Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Somalia, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There are ISIS/Al-Qaeda affiliates in Libya, Egypt, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, and there are as many as 10,000 paramilitaries in Iraq and Syria; Both ISIS and al-Qaeda have ongoing links in Afghanistan.

Last year, the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated that there were about 230,000 Islamist paramilitary groups in nearly 70 countries, a fourfold increase from 2001. Whatever happens in Afghanistan, the creation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will be a huge boost to the movement International.

It is by no means certain that the growing Taliban regime in Afghanistan will allow cross-border Islamist movements to thrive and plot attacks abroad. This may have been the case in 1998-2001, but the Taliban were fighting a costly civil war against Northern Alliance warlords, relied on outside help from the likes of bin Laden and al-Qaeda, and were more than willing to allow them to “turn out to be foreigners” in return.

It is possible that the Taliban would emerge more politically advanced than their victory, avoiding that opportunity. It may also consider its potential international legitimacy. Three weeks ago, China hosted a senior Taliban delegation for several days of high-level talks, and each side had a lot to gain.

For the Taliban, the opening of the border with China at the end of the Wakhan Corridor and the Chinese money being invested in development is highly desirable, as is tacit political recognition by China. In return, China will be able to take advantage of Afghanistan’s vast mineral resources, acquire new trade routes and ask the Taliban to rein in the paramilitary Uyghurs currently in their ranks.

The ideology of ISIS/Al-Qaeda is a small part of the opinion of Muslims worldwide, but its survival and potential growth will easily be seen as a threat by the Western military-industrial complex, and military operations are the primary response. This is already seen in US, French and British operations across the Sahel that use armed drones and special forces at the forefront of operations.

Whatever the long-term impact, two things can be said for certain about the Taliban’s success. The first is that human rights will be seriously eroded in Afghanistan. The other is that across the Middle East and much of Africa and Asia, wherever there is anger and resentment at the US, UK and other Western elites, this week’s victory – capping two decades of failed interventions – will be seen by the militants as a victory. A sign and sometimes an inspiration for a different future.

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