The provision of US Patriot missiles could transform Ukraine’s defences. But it is a risky move. | Jack Watling

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The Biden administration has crossed a new line in its support for Ukraine, by signaling its willingness to send Patriot air and missile defense systems to help in the war against Russia. The system — which includes powerful interceptor missiles and radar — is likely to prove highly effective for Ukraine, and represents a significant step forward in the scope and sophistication of U.S. support. But the gift of such prestigious systems will present long-term challenges for NATO.

Joe Biden previously ruled out sending Patriot systems to Ukraine. The shift in policy appears to have been triggered by Russia’s massive targeting of Ukraine’s vital civilian national infrastructure, which has left much of the country without electricity. Russia is now seeking Iranian ballistic missiles to bolster its depleted stockpile, and this, combined with continued domestic production of missiles, means these attacks could continue for a long time. Defending Ukraine from missile attacks is now a humanitarian priority.

Patriot is one of the most capable air and missile defense systems in the world. Over the past five years, Saudi Arabia has shot down hundreds of Iranian missiles fired by the Houthis using this system. Besides protecting Ukrainian cities, providing such medium-range air defenses could provide some capabilities to Ukraine’s S-300 missile systems, expanding available air cover on the front lines.

It is important to note that the system will not provide immediate protection, and thus Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure are likely to continue in the short term. Patriot is a complex system to operate and maintain. Equipment previously supplied without the need for training in how to maintain and repair it in combat conditions suffered from maintenance problems. Ensuring that Ukrainians can operate the system sustainably will take some time.

With Ukraine’s stockpile of air defense missiles running low, the country has become increasingly dependent on international support, just as it now relies on partners for the majority of its artillery and armored vehicles. This reliance comes with some risks, especially for systems where Ukraine’s partners hold limited inventories.

Some fear that providing certain military support to Ukraine risks broader escalation, but this was not the basis for the US reluctance to send the Patriot systems. The United States has far fewer than its operational analysis suggests are necessary to defend its forces in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, there is a constant demand for missiles from existing users, from Sweden to Saudi Arabia: the latter spends a large number of missiles every month to defend its critical national infrastructure. Meanwhile, missile manufacturing levels are low.

In some ways this supply problem mirrors the larger challenge of supplying ammunition to Ukraine. The Armed Forces of Ukraine’s consumption of ammunition greatly exceeds the available supply, and its artillery depletes barrels faster than they can be replaced. The hollowing out of NATO’s defense industries has left the alliance in poor shape to support ongoing high-intensity operations. In the case of systems like the Patriot, the challenge is greater because it takes much longer to manufacture precision weapons such as air defense missiles than it does to make unguided artillery shells.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine should prompt a renewal of NATO’s industrial base — investing in important munitions and machine tool factories — but that will take time. In the run-up to oversupply being available, and with the current pressure on demand, there is also the risk that by providing key systems to Ukraine, the West is doing so at the expense of its deterrent attitude towards China over its threats to Taiwan independence.

In the face of such competing pressures, the United States and other Ukrainian partners have had to carefully balance the support they provide to Ukraine between those systems that its military can be trained to operate with, those that NATO’s defense industry can maintain, and the security needs of donors. In this context, while Patriot presents a good option for defeating cruise and ballistic missiles targeting Ukrainian cities, it is important that local air defense officers understand that they cannot expend endless supplies of these munitions and that they prioritize them accordingly.

The Patriot is certainly capable of shooting down Iranian-made Shahed-136 missiles, munitions that have also been used to strike energy infrastructure. But if it is used in this role, Kyiv will quickly run out of missiles. This has already happened with the GMLRS, the long-range missile supplied to Ukraine. Although its forces were initially eager to use the GMRLS against high-priority targets, they were increasingly used on a large scale, contributing to the operational success in the liberation of Kherson, but vastly exceeding the rate of consumption of these missiles supported by Ukraine’s partners.

Providing the Patriot system—like others before it—is not a magic bullet. It provides defense for Ukraine against a specific threat. But finding a sustainable and affordable way to overcome other threats to Ukraine’s energy security on a large scale will require some creative thinking and investment by Ukraine’s partners. It is also essential to global stability that the provision of these systems be matched by the ability to industrially replenish NATO stocks – and to convince China that production can continue in the event of a larger conflict.

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