The Islamic State is cautiously optimistic about Turkey’s new operation in Syria

Over the past few weeks, members of the Islamic State have expressed cautious optimism on Internet forums about the benefits of a potential Turkish military operation in northeastern Syria. For the scattered fighters, Turkey’s next offensive against the Syrian Democratic Forces may present a unique opportunity to regain their strength. Considering organizations weakened (yet persistent) state, their optimism may be misplaced. Still, it would be better if the world didn’t know.

Ankarali since the end of November Operation Claw-Sword Syria is targeting Kurdish forces with long-range rocket and missile strikes on bases and installations in Syria. Ankara has repeatedly made full-scale threats raid the groundOwned by Syrian Kurdish leaders he said would prevent them from continuing operations against the Islamic State. As Ankara continues to roll back its resistance to U.S. and Russian plans, U.S. policymakers must do everything they can to prevent Islamic State forces from getting the opportunity they hope for.

Pressure and Opportunity

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan continues brand Although the Syrian Democratic Forces are a terrorist threat, they remain a key bulwark against the Islamic State in Syria and a key enabler of the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State. Panja-Kilinj The infrastructure and capabilities of the Syrian Democratic Forces, even the bases shared with US forces, have already deteriorated and continue to deteriorate. hit. Shortly after Ankara started the operation, the grouping made public At the same time, if it has to withstand Turkey’s attacks, it will not be able to put pressure on the secret networks of the Islamic States. And there are groups of high-ranking officials expressed They are worried about the obvious lack of support of the Global Coalition states in the face of Turkey’s campaign.

On December 2, Syrian Kurdish forces announced A freeze on operations against the Islamic State in northeastern Syria, including the suspension of all joint patrols, training activities and special operations. In case of moratorium was raised That day’s incident speaks to the fragility of the situation and highlights the fact that if Turkey ever launches a new ground attack on Syria, Kurdish fighters will not hesitate to reassess their resources and capabilities to defend themselves, even if it weakens. broader Global Coalition counterterrorism efforts.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Islamic State supporters in the region see the degradation of the Syrian Democratic Forces as a potentially transformative opportunity. Even the Islamic State’s own official reports indicate that its prospects in Syria have not looked good in recent months. The chart above shows that in 2022, compared to the first six months of 2021, there were fewer than twice as many operations per month in Syria. While the Islamic State is known unprovoked attacks, especially in the Syrian theater, his official reports nonetheless show an important reflection of his perceived power. On this basis, anything that could change the trajectory of the hidden caliphate in Syria could cause agitation among its members.

The leadership of the Islamic State itself has not yet commented specifically on this issue, as they are still moving in this direction. to kill their leader, Abul Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, is a member of the Islamic State in Syria, the so-called munasirin, were discussing what Operation Claw-Sword could mean for the movement. So far, their responses have been largely optimistic, but also tempered by calls for restraint.

Optimism and restraint

Turkey in a few minutes first air raid On Nov. 20, Islamic State supporters were hailing his latest intervention as a strategic boon for increasingly strained networks in Syria. Largely, in the weeks since, their response has been characterized by a sense of optimism, based on the idea that the current air operation is only a preamble to Turkey’s ground operation. cute grind whatever remains [Syrian Democratic Forces] turns to dust.

According to these considerations, the collapse of the Syrian Democratic Forces or simply the diversion of its resources away from operations against the Islamic State will allow for the intensification of offensive activity. According to one prominent Islamic State military analyst on Telegram, this would end the attrition phase, ushering in a new era of low-intensity asymmetric warfare and bone-breaking that the group is currently engaged in. jacket too. A word in the nomenclature of Islamic States jacket too or consolidation The last phase we have not seen in the movement in Syria since the beginning of 2019 refers to the rebellion and territorial control.

How realistic is this estimate? Recent official communications from the Islamic State’s media apparatus in Syria indicate that it maintains a substantial and moderately well-equipped network in the eastern provinces of Homs, Raqqa, Deir Ezzor and Hasakeh, and potentially beyond. The images below, which surfaced in early December, were distributed in part to demonstrate the continued coherence of Islamic State in Syria after the death of its Darada leader in October. They appeared at what could be a critical strategic juncture. In the absence of regular operations in the country, the Islamic State Media Diwan seeks to signal that it maintains an advanced standing force there that can operate quickly.

All told, the Islamic State’s response to the sword also underscores the groups’ current vulnerability and limited ability to take full advantage of the opportunity Turkey’s new operation will present. Some within the movement are actively tempering expectations in closed online discussions, encouraging colleagues not to rush into a new campaign without direction from their leadership. These figures argue that Turkish airstrikes alone will not be enough to make a noticeable operational difference on the ground, and talk of a Turkish ground invasion may still be unrealistic.

Moreover, there is no love lost between Ankara and the Islamic State. Their animosity is well known and deeply rooted, especially following the Turkish leadership Operation Euphrates Shield 2016 and 2017 eventually saw the Islamic State burning several Turkish soldiers are alive in the film. This means that even if Erdogan launches a ground attack and deals a serious blow to the Syrian Democratic Forces, the remnant networks of the caliphate will not suddenly operate in friendly territory.

Accordingly, many of these calls for restraint are aimed at managing the hopes of Islamic State supporters held in prisons owned by the Syrian Democratic Forces in the northeast, as well as in al-Hol and, to a lesser extent, Roj. camps. Since 2019, Islamic State leaders repeatedly reported He said that their priority in Syria is the release of their supporters detained in the northeast. Indeed, it has been a central theme in every strategic statement since the military defeat of the caliphate in Baghus in March 2019.

However, it was only in January 2022 that the Islamic State’s intentions were shown to be nothing more than rhetoric. The Escape from Gwayran prison it was a symbolic success but an operational failure. The attack has strengthened the group, but there is still no clear evidence that it has or will have a meaningful impact on its capabilities in Syria. Regardless, it is certain that similar efforts will be made to free supporters in prisons in the northeast, especially since Claw-Sword has raised expectations.

Results

If Turkey indeed intervenes in Syria from a new ground, it has the potential to improve the operational prospects of the Islamic States in both the short and medium term. With greater instability in northeastern Syria and the distraction of a key partner of the Global Coalitions, the Islamic State will have more room to project its power. It doesn’t mean going back to it golden From 2014 to 2016, a complex, effective and brutal regime was observed in various regions of Syria. Rather, it represents a markedly more aggressive and assertive rebellion that does more than celebrate presence and determination.

Considering the consecutive loss of two caliphs in Syria in 2022, it is difficult to predict the consequences of such a revival in the kinetic activity of the Islamic State in the country. With their operations in Iraq lowest descent for more than a decade, and his media brand now revolves around more West and East Africa Remnant networks of movements in Syria will have to make quite a leap to reclaim their past legacies and position as a key component of the global Islamic State insurgency. Regardless, as good as the military prospects are in places like the Lake Chad basin, Syria, like Iraq, is too ideologically important for him to give up.

Currently, there is no indication that operations are planned to use the Claw-Sword. Indeed, there are clear attempts to lower the expectations of supporters, especially those in detention centers hoping for an operation to liberate Islamic State cells. However, observers also noted that local networks in Syria had calmed down in the run-up to the Ghwayran prison attack. Beyond indirect suggestions of Islamic State’s operational intent and potential, it is highly unlikely that any new campaign is in the works. Moreover, the group recently acknowledged the death of its last caliph, Abul Hassan al-Hashimi, in October. This means that the time is right for al-Hashimi’s revenge campaign, as it was after the deaths of two of his predecessors.

In the near term, it is critical that US forces and their partners continue to pressure the remnants of the Islamic State in Syria. A dead caliph is a tactical victory, but not a strategic one. It was based on joint air-to-ground missile strikes in Al-Bab on Tuesday. reports They suggested targeting a high-ranking Islamic State official from Yemen, which appears to have been the plan.

However, in addition to this kinetic pressure against the Islamic State, the United States should exert diplomatic pressure on Turkey to reduce the chances of a new land intervention. If this were to happen and the Syrian Democratic Forces were to cease their operations, however briefly, US tactics in Syria would almost certainly shift to short-term, reactive unilateralism rather than attempts at strategic interdiction. This is a change that the mission to fight the Islamic State cannot handle.

Dr. Charlie is the Research Director of Winter ExTrac, an AI-powered threat intelligence system. Over the past decade, he has held a number of academic positions in the US and UK, investigating how and why insurgents innovate to pursue their political and military agendas in both online and offline spaces.

Image: Wikimedia Commons