Technology is wary of the more pressing decoupling problem

[ad_1]

We have seen global leaders take action to make supply chains more resilient and secure with technologies critical to national interests, such as the US banning exports of high-end chip-making technologies to China and negotiating deals with Japan and the Netherlands.

We’ve also seen an abundance of Chinese technology issues, from TikTok user data being accessed in China to Huawei bans.

Even in the last week, we’ve found more than 900 Chinese-made security cameras in Australian government buildings, as the US has shot down Chinese spy balloons.

However, until now, we had no idea what Australians, Americans and Japanese really thought about trust and mistrust in technology and the potential for decoupling.

The United States Studies Center (USSC) conducted a public opinion survey in late 2022 in the United States, Australia and Japan to understand public sentiment in each nation on a variety of issues.

This unpublished survey data reveals the depth of concern about Chinese technology among Australian, American and Japanese populations and across multiple data points. It also shows support for stable or even increased country restrictions on Chinese technology and deep distrust and concern for Chinese mobile devices.

Australian government official and defense buildings were discovered this month to have Chinese surveillance cameras that are banned in the US and UK.

Our polling data shows that public opinion is concerned that Chinese technology poses a threat to national security. All three audiences agreed that existing restrictions on Chinese companies should continue (3238% across all countries) or increase (3742%) to include those firms that supply telecommunication products and develop future technologies such as quantum and artificial intelligence. Less than 10% in any country wanted restrictions eased.

The overwhelming levels of public support for expanding technological collaboration among allies, especially the United States, Australia and Japan, are therefore not surprising. Overwhelming majority (70% or more) of respondents in the US, Australia and Japan want to see greater collaboration with allies on issues related to climate change and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computers and manufacturing of semiconductors.

If we are to unleash this trilateral enthusiasm for collaboration, public-private partnerships will be key, with much of the skill and scale needed for this work developing advanced capabilities and emerging technologies from industry.

In a geopolitical sense, the Indo-Pacific region is increasingly defined by a multipolarity. In adopting technology, the choices are starker.

Supply chains are global in nature, which means that alignment of views among allies is important, as demonstrated by the US-Japan-Netherlands agreement on semiconductor export controls.

However, most technologies are designed, manufactured and/or upgraded by the United States or China, from individual cell phones to national telecommunications infrastructure and weapon systems.

Separating digital innovation, technology, and data flows considered critical to national security is one thing, but individual user choice in favor of US technology adds a different dimension to the conversation.

Across multiple data points, this survey data shows that respondents from all countries are interested in technology from China and prefer US technology. A slight majority of Australian voters indicated that they do not trust or mostly do not trust Chinese technology.

Japanese respondents were the most wary of Chinese technology (83%), followed by the United States (68%) and Australia (54%). In all three countries, there was a correlation between age and trust, with older citizens (65 and older) placing the least trust in Chinese technology.

It’s hard to separate stated intention and action, but even so, these figures are startling. They show that a slim majority of voters across all age groups and surveyed countries are not at all willing to download Chinese apps.

Conversely, the vast majority of Australian voters indicated they completely or mostly trust US technology with a small but still substantial number of respondents (20%) indicating they mostly or completely distrust US technology. United States.

Along these lines, USSC polling data shows that a substantial number of respondents from Australia, as well as the United States and Japan, are willing to pay more for technology than from China. As my colleagues Jared Mondschein and Victoria Cooper recently revealed, over 70% of Americans and Australians would pay $500 more for a phone not made in China.

This survey shows concern from an individual user’s perspective, with willingness to pay more for smartphone technology not made in China, lower levels of trust in Chinese technology than US technology, and less willingness to download Chinese apps than US-owned applications. While it is difficult to know how many of these stated intentions will translate into action, it nevertheless shows a clear individual preference for technology with a reliable lineage.

What we are likely to see is an increase in difficult national security conversations around trustworthy and distrustful technologies, as well as a growing user demand for technologies that keep their data secure, are created by trusted entities, can be regulated, and have safeguards to mitigate the damage.

As governments debate the feasibility of decoupling technologies, perhaps users are making the decision for them. Technological distrust is, in fact, the real decoupling problem we face today.

Dr. Miah Hammond-Errey is the Emerging Technology Program Director at the US Center for Studies at the University of Sydney.

Do you know more? Contact James Riley by email.

[ad_2]