Marines slam dwindling amphibious fleet, but Navy not to blame

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The recent evacuation of the United States Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, was notable, not only for its success, but also because such missions, once a standard capability for Navy and Navy amphibious forces , are now apparently to be carried out by a special operations force. And the Body has only itself to blame.

The genesis of an amphibious transport deficit is the Corps’ abandonment of its long-standing need for a larger fleet of 38 ships. This requirement, formalized in a 2009 agreement between the Secretary of the Navy, the Commander of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, led to a decade-long reversal of the dwindling number of amphibious ships.

This positive trend changed with the 2019 Commanders Directives, in which he stated that the main rationale for 38, the ability to support a two-brigade landing, was no longer valid.

Setting the stage for the Corps’ future operational concept, Force Design 2030, the commander argued that different approaches are needed in the face of modern threats to massive naval armadas.

Instead, the Corps would concentrate on smaller units scattered across the coastlines.

The scattering might well be justified in light of the projected threats, but what the commander overlooked was that dropping a requirement without articulating a new one meant the Navy would simply shift the funding. In short, the Corps touted its divestment approach to investing, the Navy only heard of divestment.

As the retirement of older ships and the delay of new ones became a reality, Navy leaders worked to stem the bleeding.

It articulated a new minimum of 31 ships in 2022, but unlike the previous requirement, the new number offered no operational logic beyond previous Navy Department studies, which actually only allowed 28 ships.

Congress nonetheless backed the Marines’ new number and inserted language in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2023 to require the Navy to maintain a fleet of 31.

At the Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive (OSD), the Navy plans to suspend its successful Dockside Landing Platform (LPD-17 Flight II) shipbuilding program and expedite the dismantling of its ships Dock Disembarkation (LSD-41/49) earlier. If the line of Docked Landing Platform Ships is not continued, the Amphibious Fleet will eventually decline to 25 ships when the last of the Docked Landing Ships are gone.

Maritime leadership is now obsessed with maintaining 31 ships. A Navy official recently said the size of the Navy’s amphibious fleet left the Corps unable to respond to the earthquake in Turkey. He took the opportunity to reinforce the requirement: 31 is the number.

The problem is that the Navy currently has 31 amphibious ships. A listener would be forgiven for some confusion: a fleet of 31 ships is inadequate, but a fleet of 31 ships is what the Corps must have?

As the crisis in Sudan shows, 31 ships are not enough. Such a small fleet does not meet the needs of the Corps, including sufficient marine expeditionary unit deployments. These forward deployed units provide flexible forces for a variety of routine operations such as engagement with allies and partners and presence in troubled areas. Marines, vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment are well suited to respond to earthquakes, typhoons, noncombatant evacuations, and other contingencies. But they can only do that if they have the ships to operate from.

In the past, Navy Expeditionary Units and the Navy Amphibious Ready Group ships they embarked deployed in overlapping cycles, providing a continuous presence in key areas. With 31 ships, this presence is regularly interrupted, meaning that a deployed MEU/ARG returns home months before the next departs.

The absence of a MEU/ARG near Sudan is a predictable consequence of an inadequate fleet. The MEU/ARG closest to Sudan remains in pre-deployment training, its predecessors having returned to the United States months ago.

Deploying ships to respond to a small-scale contingency, or to reinforce units responding to a larger one, is often impossible with such a small fleet. A robust amphibious fleet is essential to respond to the crisis, and the failure to react in Sudan and Turkey are just the latest examples. When asked to expedite an MEU/ARG deployment as war in Ukraine erupted in 2022, the ships were unable to deploy early, Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl told the Senate Subcommittee on maritime power of the armed forces.

Fewer ships stress the remaining fleet. Ships require extended maintenance periods between deployments.

However, at the start of maintenance, additional problems, often related to corrosion, are discovered and decisions must be made whether to extend maintenance or postpone repairs. Amphibious ships, whose well decks literally invite the sea inside the ship’s hull, are particularly sensitive.

Lowest ship readiness rates are an indicator of an overloaded fleet more than any other contributing factor. According to the commander, less than a third of the Navy’s amphibious ships are ready to deploy, Defense One reported.

The commander is working hard to reverse these developments, but rebuilding the fleet will require a sustained, long-term effort and a true partnership with the Navy, OSD, and Congress to prioritize resources toward this critical national requirement.

Maj. Gen. Christopher Owens (Retired) is a career Marine Corps officer, aviator, educator, and operational planner. From 2015 to 2017, he held the position of Director of Naval Operations Expeditionary Warfare (OPNAV N95).

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This article is an editorial and as such the views expressed are those of the author. If you would like to respond or would like to submit your own op-ed, please email Andrea Scott, Senior Editor of the Marine Corps Times.

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