How Vladimir Putin’s unpopularity at home can fuel the crisis in Ukraine

ΤThe Kremlin has offered many explanations for the deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops, including tanks, artillery and aircraft, along Russia’s southern border with Ukraine.

The Kremlin has said that maneuvering 50 regular battlefield groups toward Ukraine is just routine training. Vladimir Putin also demanded immediate guarantees that NATO would stay out of Ukraine.

Most defense analysts see Ukraine’s increasingly friendly relationship with the United States, NATO and the European Union as a red line for Putin. To prevent the West from getting closer to its borders, many also believe that a Russian military invasion of Ukraine could take place, which is likely to take place in the coming weeks.

Without a doubt, the Kremlin sees NATO’s further expansion to the east as an existential threat. There is, however, another reason why Russia wants to reinforce its narrative of the threat: the disgusting sentiment of Putin and his allies in the loss of domestic power.

There is ample evidence that Putin feels that his reign is on unstable ground. Last year, FSB agents tested to eliminate Putin’s most ardent critic, Alexei Navalny, by poisoning him with the typically deadly nerve agent Novichok. When that did not work, Putin simply put him in jail.

Following mass demonstrations over Navalny’s arrest in early 2021, the Moscow City Court ruled that many opposition organizations (including the Navalny Anti-Corruption Foundation) were “extremist organizations”. Russian citizens can now be arrested and imprisoned simply for supporting opposition organizations. In the run-up to this year’s state elections, Putin’s camp has taken extreme measures (even by its own standards) to ensure that its United Russia party remains in power.

None of this is like the actions of a democratic leader who feels empowered by his constituents. Instead, these are the behaviors of a desperate despot who tightens his grip on control.

There are some statistics that may cause the Russian president some concern. According According to the independent Russian non-governmental research organization Levanda Center, in November, 45% of Russians had a positive view of the United States, while 42% of respondents had a negative view of America. The results were the first time in two years that Russians had a more favorable than unfavorable view of the US In the same survey, 48% had a good opinion of the EU instead of 38% who viewed the EU unfavorably.

In 2020, Putin approval evaluation in Russia fell to 59%. Still quite high compared to the typical acceptance rates of American presidents. For Putin, however, that was a record low since he became prime minister in 1999.

So what should an authoritarian do when faced with unpopularity and increased public favor for his traditional enemies? Go back to the same book that worked in the past.

In 2013, Putin’s approval The score dropped to 62%, the second lowest of his term. However, the year after Putin sank Russian forces in Ukraine and occupied Crimea, public support rose to almost 86%, making him a global most popular politician of that time.

Perhaps more pressing than repelling the West, Putin is likely to see the Russians as a common enemy and invade Ukraine as a means of gaining popular support. At least enough worship to maintain the illusion of democracy coming in Russia’s 2024 presidential election.

However, returning to the same well that operated before could have a boomerang.

Recently polls show that only 16% of Russians feel that Russia is “surrounded by enemies on all sides”, 10 points lower than in 2014 before the annexation of Crimea by Russia. 23% of Russians believe that Russia and Ukraine should be friendly but separate nations. By comparison, only 17% supported the union of the two former Soviet states.

Of the young people who would always be called upon to fight in the outbreak of war, a staggering 66% of Russians aged 18-24 have a “very positive attitude” towards Ukraine. The young Russians’ favorable view of Ukraine is, in some cases, more than double that of NATO allies. view each other.

Suppose NATO and the United States firmly keep their promises to support Ukraine and impose severe sanctions in the event of a Russian invasion of Ukraine. In that case, Putin could be back in the corner. The further development of the already besieged Russian economy could have the exact opposite effect on Putin’s public opinion.

History has shown that when an authoritarian decides that he can no longer maintain public favor, he can become unpredictable and dangerous. Fortunately, it seems Putin is not there yet. Unfortunately, depending on what he decides to do in Ukraine, that could change.

Tim McMillan is a retired police lieutenant, investigative reporter, and co-founder and CEO of Debrief. His writing covers defense, science and the information community. Follow @lttimmcmillan.