Can Japan really trust the United States?

Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and author of nine books, including “Asian Domination: The Rise of China, India, and Japan.”

Japan is the most important ally of the United States in Asia. Because of the expansionist policies of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Japan faces urgent security challenges, and these policies seem to be driven by increasing willingness to take risks.

After accelerating a provocative air and sea invasion campaign aimed at challenging Japan’s control of the Senkaku Islands, Beijing claimed and called it the Diaoyu Islands, and Xi Jinping also focused on annexing Taiwan, which is geographically an extension of the Japanese archipelago.

To strengthen China’s military intimidation against Taiwan — the first colony of the Japanese Empire — Xi Jinping recently vowed to smash any attempts to block its “historical mission” to incorporate Taiwan’s democracy.

No country is more threatened by China’s invasion of Taiwan than Japan. Japan is a peaceful country that has not fired a shot since World War II. In fact, as Japan’s Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso said recently, Japan views this invasion as an existential threat to its security, making it possible to defend Taiwan with the United States. This prompted the Chinese Communist Party to threaten “Japan’s survival” with military retaliation, including through “continuous” nuclear bombing.

There are more American soldiers permanently stationed in Japan than any other country. Approximately 54,000 military personnel are distributed in more than 80 American military installations on Japanese territory. This is part of a long-term mission to maintain peace in the Pacific. The 1960 bilateral security treaty also promised the United States to defend Japan in the event of an attack.

So, what explains the growing sense of insecurity in Japan?

First, in the past eight years, China’s official military spending has expanded to four times that of Japan. The gap is even greater, because China’s official budget hides a large part of its defense spending, and external organizations estimate that China’s actual military spending is 40% higher.

In addition, Japan’s population, which accounts for 8.7% of China’s population, is not only aging, but also shrinking. This unfavorable demographic trend has exacerbated Japan’s security concerns, including how to effectively supervise a vast exclusive economic zone with 6,852 islands larger than China.

Coupled with the unpredictability of the United States, this caused anxiety in Tokyo and explained why successive Japanese prime ministers have repeatedly sought the United States to ensure that the Senkaku Islands fall within the scope of the 1960 Treaty.

The Senkaku Islands are part of the Ryukyu island chain centered on Okinawa. After the Second World War, the United States occupied the island for 20 years longer than the rest of Japan. Even after returning to Okinawa in 1972, the United States has for many years rejected Japan’s request for abandoning its neutral position on the Senkaku Islands.

Ships of the Chinese Maritime Supervisor and the Japanese Maritime Police near the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. © Reuters

The United States eventually gave up its neutrality, but the first non-warning guarantee of the United States on the Diaoyu Islands did not appear until Donald Trump became president.U.S. President Joe Biden recently provided Trump-style clear assurances when meeting with Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. Their joint statement reiterated that “Article 5 of the Convention” [1960] The treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. “

But can Japan really trust the security guarantees of the United States? Despite the signing of a mutual defense treaty with Manila, since the capture of Scarborough Shoal in 2012, the United States has been sitting by and watching China’s gradual occupation of the Philippine sea backyard. The United States’ lack of response to Scarborough’s arrest has sounded a wake-up call for Tokyo.

When China unilaterally established an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) covering the Senkaku Islands in 2013, Japan received the second alarm. Washington did not express its opposition by postponing the then Vice President Biden’s visit to Beijing, but suggested that American commercial airlines respect China’s air defense identification zone.

This reckless behavior allows China to turn its historical claims on the South China Sea into reality with impunity. The repression in Hong Kong further highlights that a courageous Xi Jinping is changing the status quo.

However, despite its relative decline, the United States is still following its old diplomatic script. Secretary of State Anthony Brinken sought help from India in Afghanistan during his recent visit to New Delhi, but said nothing about China’s invasion of India that turned the Himalayas into Asia’s largest flashpoint.

Japan is faced with a clear choice: to strengthen security or to be besieged. However, paradoxically, one of the main obstacles to Tokyo’s establishment of a strong military capability to deter China independently is the constitution imposed by the United States. No other country in the world is subject to the kind of constitutional restrictions imposed by the occupying United States on defeated Japan, including the prohibition on acquiring offensive capabilities.

Today, such constitutional restrictions are not in the interests of the United States. After all, a more confident, safer Japan that can deter China alone will contribute to regional security, including preventing the Xi Jinping regime from seizing Taiwan. The United States must “normalize” Japan’s security posture by encouraging constitutional reforms and help the country transform into a military-independent but non-nuclear-weapon power like Britain and France.

While maintaining a security alliance with Washington, Japan must build strong capabilities, including the ability to conduct offensive networks and naval operations, so that it can defend itself when necessary. The worst option is to get comfort from American security guarantees on a regular basis, just as a spouse experiencing a midlife crisis seeks repeated guarantees of their partner’s commitment.