China’s New Era After Xi Jinping – 12/25/2022 – Latinoamrica21

The dust settled a few years after Tiananmen, and until Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China’s relations with the Western world were quiet for 30 years. It wasn’t a time without tension, but everyone won. China set the course for modernization, instituted structural reforms, and entered global trade with enthusiastic support from the West.

With the emergence of the world’s factory and globalization, China’s domestic demand began to shake the market, and China began to internationalize. Everything is going smooth. Beijing has also managed to convey the idea that it will take time to implement political reforms. Armed with this alibi, democracies continue to benefit from favorable conditions while maintaining a clear conscience.

However, after Xi Jinping came to power, everything began to change. He inherited a stronger and more prosperous China: competing globally, acquiring assets and technology, building infrastructure and influence. A titan who competes diplomatically, a man against world order, a man who accepts no one’s scrutiny, a man who tolerates no criticism.

Domestically, a thriving urban middle class and an innovative private sector connected to the world reflect the country’s modernity and relative well-being. Xi Jinping sees the qualitative leap not as a force but as a threat. Like Taiwan and South Korea, as well as many Latin American countries, China has met the requirements and the time is ripe for political transformation.

Facing the prospect of an unstoppable democratization movement and the profound lessons of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Xi stepped on the brakes. And, according to its political logic, the regime pushes for self-defense to re-centralize the power of the Communist Party (PCC) to ensure its control of society, its control of the economy and the preventive elimination of any opposition.

So to root out what Mr. Xi calls the whirlwind, he has launched a campaign to crack down on hidden dangers posed by corruption, ideological dissent and Western influence. With the so-called Document No. 9, an internal circular in 2013 banning the promotion of “dangerous” democratic values ​​in China, an ideological hostility toward the West and its freedom-based political value system has taken shape.

China has developed an image and likeness of Xi Jinping over the past decade, increasingly autocratic, confirmed at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China. The secret meeting not only cemented Xi Jinping’s third term in office, and perhaps his continuation of power, but also overturned the collective leadership established nearly half a century ago to prevent individualistic biases from leading to anarchy in China, much like Mao’s as happened during the period of communism.

Surrounded by collaborators whose merit lies in their loyalty to him, and with no internal opposition at the communist summit, Xi will have the free will to exercise power as he sees fit. All of this affects Latin America. Let’s see why. The relationship that has been built with China since the turn of the century has been built on the indisputable assumption that such linkages yield fundamental economic gains for the region.

Exports, investment, GDP growth and other macroeconomic data support this view, and are thus often cited as evidence that Latin America benefits from Chinese demand and its presence on the continent. Granted, a finer analysis introduces nuance. Latin America, for example, does not know how to take advantage of its dealings with China to create wealth-creating value-added industries, thereby cementing its position as a pure exporter of unprocessed natural resources.

Or the consequences of the Chinese model in terms of socio-environmental impact, and the commercial or financial dependence that some countries have already had on China. However, the negative aspects are overshadowed by a stronger idea: China’s strategic importance to Latin America’s future. Thus, the entire relationship with the Asian powers is subordinated to economic pragmatism, which explains the acquiescence and official silence on Chinese authoritarianism.

But what if China suffers its biggest recession in 40 years? Will this change things in Latin America? This question is pertinent because the economic situation in China does not look good. A sharp decline that seemed impossible for decades is taking place. The fact that the World Bank is forecasting growth of 2.8% this year rings all alarm bells in the social and political context of China.

According to Freedom, the decline is not cyclical but a result of the housing crisis, which has the potential to affect other parts of the economy, as well as the harsh restrictions of a zero-covid policy that has crippled consumption and fueled outrage and protests across the country. social protest. house. These aren’t the only challenges.

A development model based on exports, urbanization and heavy investment is showing signs of fatigue. The selective decoupling of the democratic world and U.S. semiconductor export controls has huge implications for China, painting a complex and fraught future for the communist government.

Not to mention geopolitical uncertainty. The gala is coming to an end, and China and its relations with the rest of the world are entering an arguably more complicated new era. Latin America, which has benefited from China’s prosperity for more than two decades, may see its hopes of the Asian giant faltered.

If the bad omens come true, Latin American governments will have to adapt to a different scenario, dealing with China, which is less attractive because of its authoritarian tendencies and not offering the usual opportunities.

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