Lawmakers point to investigations into US government use of foreign spyware

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WASHINGTON Top lawmakers have said they will investigate the government’s purchase and use of powerful spyware made by two Israeli hacking firms, as Congress passed a measure in recent days to try to curb proliferation hacking tools.

Rep. Adam Schiff, the California Democrat who is chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, sent a letter last week to the head of the Drug Enforcement Administration requesting detailed information about the agencies’ use of Graphite, a spyware product produced by the Israeli company Paragon.

Such use could have potential implications for U.S. national security, as well as run counter to efforts to deter the wide proliferation of powerful surveillance capabilities for autocratic regimes and others who might abuse them. , Mr. Schiff wrote in the letter.

Graphite, like the better-known Israeli hacking tool Pegasus, can penetrate the cellphones of its targets and extract messages, videos, photos and other content. The New York Times revealed this month that the DEA uses Graphite in its overseas operations. The agency said it uses the tool legally and only outside the United States, but did not respond to questions about whether US citizens can be targeted with the hacking tool.

Mr. Schiff asked Anne Milgram, the DEA administrator, to respond by Jan. 15 to questions submitted in a classified addendum to the drug agency.

By then, Republicans will have seized power in the House and Mr. Schiff will no longer be chairman of the committee. But the committees’ efforts to limit the spread of foreign spyware have been bipartisan, so the change is unlikely to affect its agenda on this issue.

Countries around the world have embraced commercial spyware for the new surveillance powers it gives them. Israeli company NSO held a virtual monopoly in the industry for nearly a decade selling Pegasus to Mexico, Saudi Arabia, India and other countries, but new companies peddling other hacking tools have found success as demand has skyrocketed.

The omnibus spending bill that Congress passed last week includes provisions that give the Director of National Intelligence the power to prohibit the intelligence community from purchasing foreign spyware, and requires the Director of Intelligence to submit to Congress each year a watch list identifying foreign spyware companies that pose a risk to US intelligence agencies.

Separately, Senator Ron Wyden, an Oregon Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, is lobbying the Federal Bureau of Investigation for information on the bureaus’ purchase and testing of the ONS’ Pegasus spyware. . Hacking tools from Israeli companies have been used by autocratic and democratic governments to target journalists, dissidents and human rights defenders.

The Times reported last month that internal FBI documents showed the Bureaus Criminal Division in 2021 had developed guidelines for the use of Pegasus in criminal investigations before FBI senior management decided not to use the device. spyware in operations.

What we consider before using anonymous sources. Do the sources know the information? What is their motivation for telling us? Have they proven themselves in the past? Can we corroborate the information? Even with those questions answered, the Times uses anonymous sources as a last resort. The journalist and at least one editor know the identity of the source.

In a letter last week to FBI Director Christopher Wray, Mr. Wyden asked the bureau for information on why it chose not to deploy Pegasus, and whether the bureau’s lawyers had made a decision that would prevent the FBI from using Pegasus or similar hacking tools. .

The American people have a right to know the extent of the FBI’s hacking activities and the rules that govern the use of this controversial surveillance technique, Wyden wrote.

A government legal brief tied to a Times Freedom of Information Act lawsuit against the FBI said it’s not because the FBI ultimately decided not to deploy the tool in support of criminal investigations. that it would not potentially test, evaluate, or deploy other similar tools to access encrypted communications used by criminals.

The Biden administration late last year placed NSO and another Israeli hacking firm on a Commerce Department blacklist barring US companies from doing business with both companies.

The move, along with a move by Israel’s Defense Ministry to reduce the number of countries to which companies can potentially sell their hacking tools, has rattled Israel’s hacking industry, drying up investment in the companies amid fears that they too could land on the American blacklist. A senior Israeli military official estimates that soon only six offensive technology companies will withdraw from the 18 companies that operated in Israel before the NSO blacklisting.

But now the Israeli Defense Ministry appears to be considering easing restrictions on businesses to try to prevent the industry from collapsing, according to two Israeli military officials who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive decision making.

When asked if Israel had made a final decision on easing restrictions, a Defense Ministry spokesperson said the goal was to improve monitoring of controlled cyber exports and create clearer instructions for vetted cyber-exporters, while reducing the risk of misuse of these systems and providing effective tools to ensure compliance with buyers’ license terms.

The Israeli government requires all hacking companies in the country to obtain an export license to sell spyware to foreign governments. Some Israelis have tried to avoid these restrictions by moving their businesses out of Israel.

One of them, retired Israeli general Tal Dilian, has set up businesses in Greece and Cyprus, and his Predator hacking tool is at the center of a growing scandal involving allegations of espionage by government officials. Greek government.

Israeli officials have publicly expressed their frustration at being powerless to regulate the activities of Israelis operating outside the country. But after recent reports of the growth of Mr. Dilian’s hacking empire, Israel’s Defense Ministry called a meeting to explore whether steps could be taken to better regulate Mr. Dilian’s operations and other people working outside of Israel. Among the options explored was whether an investigation could be opened into Mr. Dilian or whether other action could be taken against Israeli hackers who use the expertise they acquired in the Israeli army to create foreign companies beyond the reach of governments.

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