S. Korea pledges to expand regional role in Indo-Pacific strategy

In its very firstIndo-Pacific Strategy, Seoul is committed to strengthening a rules-based regional order to protect freedom, democracy and human rights. The document expands on President Yoon Suk Yeol’s earlier pledges to take greater responsibility in upholding democratic principles and is consistent with the national security strategies of the United States and Japan. Seoul stressed the danger of an expansion of North Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenal, but again refrained from clearly delineating the Chinese threat to the same degree as Washington and Tokyo.

The Yoon administration has clearly put in place a broader and more assertive South Korean posture to tackle the challenges that threaten a free, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific. Seoul has integrated economic and societal challenges, as well as security threats, into its overall Indo-Pacific strategy. Defining itself as a global pivotal state, Yoons South Korea is committed to strengthening its bilateral and minilateral partnerships to promote common interests such as maritime security, non-proliferation, the fight against terrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity and public health.

Seoul said North Korea poses a serious threat to peace and stability, not only to South Korea and the Indo-Pacific, but also to the world. Yoon’s strategy affirmed the need for North Korea’s complete denuclearization, rejecting calls from some experts to drop the UN Security Council’s demand for partial arms control goals. South Korea rightly advocates strong international efforts to fully implement the UN-required sanctions while fighting against sanctions evasions.

Yoon affirmed his bold initiative approach to Pyongyang, in which sweeping economic benefits would be provided to the regime in return for negotiated incremental steps towards denuclearization. The approach, consistent with that of the United States and Japan, rejects calls to make concessions prematurely in the vain hope that this will induce Pyongyang to resume dialogue.

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The documents’ references to nonproliferation may be an indirect rebuff of growing South Korean public support for an indigenous nuclear weapons program. The Yoon administration, like its predecessors, rejects the proposal, as well as the redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and a nuclear sharing deal, but advocacy for all three options has become more strident in recent months. Proponents point to the escalating North Korean nuclear and missile threat as well as growing uncertainty about the viability of the United States’ extended deterrence guarantee.

It should be emphasized that the Indo-Pacific Strategy continues President Yoon’s efforts to improve relations with Japan as a means of enhancing regional cooperation against common security threats and regional challenges. Yoon seeks a forward-looking partnership, despite contentious historical issues and sovereignty disputes that have strained bilateral relations. Stressing shared values ​​of liberal democracy and human rights, Seoul vowed to continue diplomatic efforts to restore trust.

President Yoon’s inauguration brought about a sea change in South Korea’s approach to Japan. South Korean-Japanese relations had crumbled when then-President Moon Jae-in pulled out of a bilateral deal to permanently and irreversibly resolve the comfort women deal (a euphemism for South Korean women forced into sexual slavery during the Japanese occupation of 1910-1945), threatened to abrogate a bilateral military intelligence sharing agreement, and refrained from resolving other contentious issues.

Under Yoon, the two countries resumed bilateral diplomatic efforts to improve relations and resumed trilateral military exercises with the United States after a five-year hiatus. The Yoon Indo-Pacific Strategy stressed that trilateral cooperation is essential to deal not only with the North Korean threat, but also with supply chain disruptions, cybersecurity, climate change, health crisis and to other emerging regional and global issues.

The discussion of the strategies of the vast Chinese threats in the region is both encouraging and disappointing. In his pages and other commentaries, Yoon has clearly aligned South Korea with the United States and other like-minded democracies in opposing China’s coercive tactics to bully Asian nations.

The Yoon administration has taken a more coordinated multilateral approach to regional threats and challenges than its predecessor. By not being too obsessed with improving relations with North Korea, President Yoon will be less beholden to China. South Korea will likely take a tougher approach to countering Chinese actions and no longer limit its policies preemptively for fear of potential reactions from Beijing.

Yoon pledged to implement a principles- and values-based foreign policy that would not acquiesce to Chinese and North Korean threats or subjugate South Korean national security interests. Yoon stressed that a strengthened comprehensive strategic alliance with the United States will form the basis for Seoul’s opening up to Beijing and Pyongyang.

But Yoon’s Indo-Pacific strategy merely describes a combination of challenges, including growing uncertainties in the security environment, democratic backsliding and geopolitical competition. Despite escalating global concerns about the impact of Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine on China’s ambitions to subjugate Taiwan, there has been only muted talk. There was only one mention of Taiwan in the context of reaffirming the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and Moscow’s criticism was contained.

The only direct mention of China is in positive terms as a key partner in achieving prosperity and peace in the Indo-Pacific region. The document says Seoul will seek to nurture a more mature relationship based on mutual respect and reciprocity.

Through successive administrations, South Korea has pursued a policy of risk-averse hedging in which it has balanced its relationship with its security guarantor (the United States) and its largest trading partner (China). South Korean officials have privately said Seoul’s heart is in Washington, but its wallet is in Beijing. South Korea feared triggering Chinese economic retaliation like Beijing had done against Japan, South Korea, Australia and Taiwan.

Criticizing Chinese actions without identifying Beijing as the culprit is consistent with recent joint US-South Korean presidential statements under the Moon and Yoon administrations. In contrast, the 2021 and 2022 U.S.-Japan joint statements more assertively and directly criticize China for its transgressions. Likewise, the Japanesenational security strategypublished in mid-December more boldly censored China.

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Seoul said subsequent ministry documents will provide more detailed implementation plans for the new Indo-Pacific strategy. In doing so, the Yoon administration should more clearly define measures to confront and combat aggressive Chinese policies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.

The Yoons Indo-Pacific Strategy commits to strengthening South Korean efforts to improve regional maritime security and maritime domain awareness while creating a mechanism for multilateral security cooperation through the East Asia Summit. ballast.

As South Korea strives to take on a bigger role in regional security, the good news is that it will build on an existing base. The South Korean military has been involved in regional security relations, capacity building efforts, and military exercises, albeit at low levels, especially compared to other regional armies.

Since his inauguration, Yoon Suk Yeol has boosted U.S.-South Korean relations and sparked optimism among U.S. officials and Korean watchers that Seoul will take a pragmatic and principled approach to authoritarian regimes. Yoon appears likely to take bigger steps than his predecessors to expand South Korea’s role in the Indo-Pacific region and counter Chinese attempts to coerce Southeast Asian and Pacific Island countries.

But Yoon will likely do so in a low-key way, not portraying these measures as anti-China and making it hard to discern whether his policies are truly different from those of his predecessors. Yoons’ actions will have to match his bold statements. The real test will come when Beijing tries to pressure Seoul to acquiesce to Chinese demands. But the recently released Indo-Pacific Strategy is another positive step for South Korea to assume a more influential and central role commensurate with its diplomatic, security and economic strengths.