A roadmap for US-China relations in 2023

[ad_1]

Chinese leaders face increasing social, economic and public health tensions in 2023. If the past is prologue, it is reasonable to expect Chinese leaders to respond by seeking to calm their environment. outer to focus on inner challenges. To help counter scrutiny of their record of national governance, they will want to portray to their people the image of dignity and respect accorded abroad. Nowhere will such symbolism matter more than in the American-Chinese context. How Chinese leaders are perceived to manage relations with the United States is often a factor in how their performance is perceived at home. While the largely competitive framework of U.S.-China relations is unlikely to change, opportunities may arise for the U.S. to advance low-key positive priorities with China over the course of the year. come.

To be clear, there is no credible indicator of any softening of China’s foreign policy toward the United States, nor any consideration of American concerns about Chinese behavior. In his 20th Party Congress work report, President Xi Jinping repeatedly stressed that China will have to struggle against Western opposition to China’s rise. Other Chinese officials also echoed at the Party Congress that the spirit of struggle will define the country’s foreign policy.

Do not bet on the reduction of tensions

On the contrary, China in the coming year will probably redouble its pressure on Taiwan and its efforts to impose its will on Hong Kong. Beijing will continue to exert an iron fist against any hint of domestic dissent. It will maintain a tight grip on regions with large ethnic minority populations, including Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. Beijing will continue to favor state intervention in its economy and will likely step up its efforts to acquire intellectual property from abroad by hook or by crook. China’s diplomatic activism is unlikely to wane. The People’s Liberation Army will expand its range and frequency of operations as its capabilities increase. China will not do the United States any favors over North Korea. Xi will also continue to invest in his and China’s relationship with Putin and Russia.

Washington will also take steps that Beijing sees as strengthening the competitive dynamics in the relationship. There will be other high-level Congressional visits to Taiwan. A Republican-controlled House will step up public criticism of Chinese activities, including probing the origins of COVID-19. Republican presidential candidates will compete to outdo each other in their hawkishness on China. The Biden administration will invest in coalition efforts to strengthen deterrence in the Asia-Pacific region and to limit China’s technological advances in national security hotspots.

Even so, Beijing can still see virtue in easing tensions with the United States. In the 1950s, Mao used a fight, fight, talk, talk strategy to buy time to regroup, study the opponent, and gather strength to resume a protracted struggle. A similar effort may be unfolding in Beijing now.

Such an approach would allow Beijing to focus on restoring the veneer of governance competence. It would also reduce the Americas’ ability to form issue-based coalitions that challenge China’s interests. And with Xi heading to the United States in November for the APEC leaders’ meeting, a calmer environment would support his interest in being given preferential treatment by US President Joe Biden.

Beijing will want to give as little as possible to benefit from stabilized relations and preferential public treatment for its leaders. From China’s perspective, a natural next step to advance these goals will be to negotiate with its American counterparts on principles to guide US-China relations. Xi has previously said the relationship should be guided by mutual respect, mutual benefit and shared commitment to peaceful coexistence. There is negligible benefit to American diplomats in being drawn into negotiations on such principles. Even if they were mutually adopted, they would not limit Chinese behavior or resolve underlying tensions in the relationship.

How the United States should respond to China

Rather than react to Chinese efforts to negotiate principles guiding the relationship, the Biden administration would be wise to lay out its concrete goals for the coming year. US Secretary of State Antony Blinkens’ trip to China in the first quarter of 2023 provides the United States with an opportunity to set the agenda. By establishing concrete goals and milestones to move them forward, Blinken could steer the relationship toward key Americas priorities and concerns. China’s emphasis on the positive outlook of Xi’s visit to the United States in November will provide an opportunity to leverage form for substance.

On the security front, both sides could take practical steps to reduce risk. This includes reaching an agreement on the limits of use of new and emerging technologies in areas where both parties are vulnerable and where no rules currently exist. For example, both sides would benefit from setting limits on the uses of artificial intelligence-based autonomous weapons systems. At first, both sides could agree that humans should be responsible for all nuclear launch decisions and that these decisions should never be delegated to systems with artificial intelligence. Similarly, both sides demonstrated destructive anti-satellite weapon systems (ASAT). They could agree to limit future testing of ASAT weapons to prevent the creation of orbital debris.

Both countries are also vulnerable to future pandemics. They have a mutual interest in creating a global disease surveillance network to detect future virus outbreaks before they spread. A similar logic applies to climate change. Methane plays a major role in rising temperatures. Both parties would benefit from pooling capabilities to advance research on methane emission reduction challenges and solutions.

America’s opioid epidemic also demands attention. Chinese officials say the problem is one of demand, not supply. Nonetheless, US and Chinese officials need to think more creatively about practical measures to reduce the flow of fentanyl containing precursor chemicals of Chinese origin to the United States.

This list of priority questions is intended to be illustrative and not exhaustive. There are other critical areas where mutual interest should dictate common goals, such as limiting Iran’s nuclear capabilities, ensuring unhindered energy flow and greater food security, combating ocean pollution and the coordination of over-indebtedness in the developing world. The fact is, there is a solid menu of issues where both sides could take parallel or coordinated action that would serve their own mutual benefit.

Is the risk worth the benefit?

Skeptics will say there is no point in pursuing a positive agenda with China, given the relationship’s inherent competitiveness and the likelihood that China will respond favorably to US proposals. Such skepticism can be proven, but it must first be tested. In 2022, such pessimism would have prevented America from successfully pressuring China to suspend material support for Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. That would have prevented Biden from luring Xi over China’s opposition to Putin’s nuclear saber-blows. It would also have prevented the Public Company Audit Oversight Council of the Americas from successfully obtaining full transparency from Chinese regulators on the books of Chinese companies listed on stock exchanges in the Americas.

Others will warn that China will insist on linking the issues, i.e. demand that the United States reduce its pressure on China in other sensitive areas, as a precondition for coordination on challenges. common. The implication of such warnings is that Washington should not be drawn into softening its stance on Taiwan or Xinjiang in pursuit of cooperation. In fact, this is nothing new. The way to move beyond Chinese demands that the United States create favorable conditions for cooperation is to first make it clear that Washington is ready for the relationship to get better or worse depending on the choices of the China, and second that Washington would recognize China’s contributions and salute its leadership in meeting the challenges. This allows China to benefit from international recognition in exchange for the United States guaranteeing concrete Chinese contributions on American priorities.

At the strategic level, leaders in the Americas are receiving a strong signal of demand from their international partners to responsibly manage competition with China. So even if Beijing refuses to comply with Americas efforts to advance a positive agenda, the world will be warned where the obstacle lies. This, in turn, will open political space for America to recruit partners on joint projects in Asia.

Situating China among the global challenges

Finally, China will be one of many pressing challenges facing the Biden administration in the new year. The White House would be in a stronger position to manage its myriad challenges, for example the pandemic, mass migration, global recession, global warming, Ukraine, food and energy shortages, and Korea’s nuclear aspirations. of the North and Iran if it is able to situate China in a set of global challenges to which it must respond. This does not mean giving China a free pass or giving ground on sensitive issues such as Taiwan, technology or human rights. America must stand firm in defending American interests and the values ​​it shares with its closest partners. Rather, it means recognizing that there are few major challenges in the world where China does not count as a partner or as a problem.

Ultimately, the United States and China are locked in a long-term competition to determine which model of governance can best solve global problems and improve the lives of its citizens. Performance will determine power perceptions. America is stronger when it improves its domestic condition and galvanizes global efforts to address common challenges, not when it is consumed by competition with ambitious but limited power.

[ad_2]