Policy Prescriptions for U.S.-China Relations

In the following discussion of U.S.-China relations, I have attempted to remain neutral, as if I were offering the objective perspective of a visitor from another galaxy rather than the Biden administration’s view you are familiar with. In fact, my following comments would be considered heresy in much of Washington.

China and the United States are in a vicious cycle of competition that, if not reversed, could seriously damage both countries and damage the rest of the world. In short, they are all currently disrupting the world order.

Later I will present proposed policy prescriptions to stem this systemic decline in U.S.-China relations.

But first, let me stress that, in my view, neither the United States nor China has made such concrete policy proposals to ease tensions in the near term. Instead, daily finger-pointing has become the order of the day. Turning off this path to global catastrophe will require compromise and political will on both sides. None of this has emerged in recent years. There is a Chinese adage that applies here, if you want to catch fish, don’t climb trees. In recent years, Washington and Beijing have climbed higher and higher on the tree.

So why has neither Beijing nor Washington shown signs of political will and compromise? There are several reasons why China may be reluctant to compromise.

• Perhaps Xi and his colleagues think they have a chance because America is in secular decline. Therefore, there is no need for Beijing to compromise.
• Perhaps Xi Jinping and others believe that the United States takes containment of China as its strategic goal: to weaken China and trigger a regime change in China. Therefore, it is too dangerous for Beijing to compromise.
• Perhaps Xi and his colleagues believe that the United States is abandoning the one-China policy, hollowing it out on the way to recognizing Taiwan as an independent state. So, again, it is too dangerous for Beijing to compromise.

Now Biden:

• Perhaps, just as the Truman administration did with the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, the Biden administration believes that the United States must significantly strengthen itself and its allies in order to successfully negotiate with China. Therefore, it is too early for Washington to compromise.
• Perhaps the Biden administration believes that seriously negotiating with China is too dangerous in terms of US domestic politics, and doing so would expose the administration to effective Republican attack before the 2024 presidential election. Therefore, the current political risk of a compromise between Biden and Xi Jinping is too great.
• Perhaps the Biden administration believes that in the foreseeable future, China will unify Taiwan by force. Therefore, the government’s focus must be on deterrence and building Taiwan’s defenses.
• Perhaps both countries see the other’s internal problems as an opportunity to advance their cases and ventures.

Regardless, there are specific and practical policy prescriptions for U.S.-China relations that can help rebuild trust and ease tensions.

Policy Prescription:

• Both sides should limit their rhetorical attacks on the other.
• As proposed by Dr. Henry Kissinger, both sides should agree to initiate an intensive bilateral dialogue, led by their national security advisers, to discuss their respective vital national interests and red lines for the other’s behaviour.
• Both sides should agree to begin negotiations to limit their respective military modernizations, including the impact of artificial intelligence on decision-making and the battlefield, as Dr Kissinger has proposed.
• Both sides should act to revive their long-held interpretations of the time-tested one-China policy.
• The two sides should resume the pattern of military activities in the Taiwan Strait before the then Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan.
• Both parties should agree to immediately begin negotiations on a maritime incident agreement.
• The two sides should agree to work together to develop a joint proposal to limit North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ease tensions on the Korean peninsula.
• Both parties should agree that their respective presidents meet every four to six months.
• The two sides should agree that the foreign ministers of the two countries will exchange visits to each other’s capitals every year and hold meetings when the two sides attend international conferences.
• The parties should agree to establish a formal joint crisis management mechanism.
• The two sides should agree to strengthen military-to-military engagement, with defense ministers meeting at least twice a year.
• Both sides should agree to intensify negotiations to reduce trade differences.
• Both parties should agree to work together on climate issues.
• Both parties should agree to work together in the field of global infectious diseases and global public health.
• Both sides should agree to make it easier for their citizens to visit each other’s country.

These policy provisions are also notable in that they do not require:

• Neither government has been asked to change the way it governs itself.
• Neither government has been asked to reduce intelligence activity against the other.
• Neither government has been asked to reduce defense modernization.
• There is no requirement that the United States stop strengthening its Asian alliances and partnerships.
• China has not been asked to stop its efforts to increase its activities and influence in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.
• There is no call for China to weaken its strategic relationship with Russia.
• There is no request for the United States to slow down arms transfers to Taiwan.
• There was no threat to demand that China stop using force to incorporate Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China.

Repeating a mutual agreement on any of these measures will require negotiation, compromise, and political will on both sides, Xi and Biden.

This would be a far cry from their policies today.

I want to make one last point. Half a century ago, early in the Nixon administration, Dr. Kissinger negotiated with Moscow a basic policy framework to resolve deep differences in the bilateral relationship. This framework and its intensive bilateral diplomacy were particularly important in avoiding US-Soviet conflict during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Returning to the dangers of a Taiwan war, there is currently no such policy framework between the United States and China, nor such intensive bilateral diplomacy.

To say this is dangerously irresponsible is an understatement.

This blog post is adapted from a speech delivered by Ambassador Blackwell at the CSIS-Chumir Global Dialogue Committee on December 16, 2022.