US-China war game shows need for victory if deterrence fails

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The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recently conducted a war game testing the scenarios and outcomes of a possible US-China war over Taiwan. The reason for the exercise was that “what was once unthinkable – a direct conflict between the United States and China – has now become a common discussion in the national security community”.

In fact, the near doomsday scenario unfolded during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-96, when China fired missiles at Taiwan and Washington sent a carrier battle group across the Taiwan Strait. . A Clinton official called it “our own Cuban missile crisis; we had looked into the abyss.

Since then, only one US aircraft carrier has entered the strait, although smaller Navy ships have made freedom of navigation transits under the Trump and Biden administrations. Aircraft carriers recently deployed by China move freely through the strait.

Vladimir Putin’s latest assault on Ukraine and Xi Jinping’s growing pressure on Taiwan – with rhetorical support from the other – have raised new alarms, the CSIS report acknowledges.

“The possibility of one country invading another to acquire territory seemed outdated. Russia [latest] The attack on Ukraine reminded the world that cross-border invasions are possible. Speculation of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan was inevitable. … [I]Invasion is the most dangerous threat to Taiwan and is therefore the first course of action to be analyzed.

The CSIS exercise was performed 24 times. “In most scenarios, the US/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained a self-governing Taiwan.”

But all parties to the war game suffered heavy casualties. “Victory is not enough. The United States must strengthen deterrence immediately. The report recommended actions to improve US capabilities:

“Increasing the arsenal of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles. Bombers capable of launching anti-ship munitions from a distance provide the fastest means of defeating the invasion with the fewest American casualties. The purchase of such missiles and upgrading existing missiles with this anti-ship capability must be the top procurement priority.

The problem, however, is less what weapons America would bring to the fight than its willingness to do so and maintain its kinetic involvement in the face of the real threat and escalation from China. Since the 1995-96 confrontation, this American will has often been questioned by Chinese, Taiwanese and American observers.

“The United States has maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity to discourage China from attacking Taiwan while discouraging Taipei from taking any action that might incite such an attack. It is also called double deterrence because it is intended to deter China from invading Taiwan and dissuading Taiwan from declaring independence.

In the narrowest sense, the politics of ambiguity has succeeded, since neither war nor formal independence has yet taken place. But the dynamic could better be described as “deferral” than “deterrence”. Over the years, China has moved inexorably toward more open and powerful aggression against Taiwan. And the people and government of Taiwan have already achieved de facto independence and greater international recognition of a distinct Taiwanese identity. Each tendency reinforced the other as the irresistible force and the still object approached a point of collision.

While the war game focused only on how a hypothetical conflict between the United States and China would play out, Washington cannot be opposed, or even neutral, to Taiwan’s international aspirations or its democratic security.

The credibility of the United States as a reliable security partner and ally has been seriously damaged by recent serious errors of action or inaction – in Georgia (2008), in Ukraine (2014), in Syria (2014), Afghanistan (2021) and Ukraine (2021).

Moreover, Taiwan is a global model in what the Trump and Biden administrations have called “the existential struggle of our time,” between democracy and autocracy.

Taiwan intimately involves not only American values ​​but, as the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) declares, its interests in “peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific” and, ultimately, the world order. Imperial Japan launched and supported World War II in the South Pacific from the island of Formosa, what General Douglas MacArthur called “the unsinkable aircraft carrier”. China is seeking to use Taiwan as a platform for its own aggressive ambitions in Southeast Asia.

CSIS had a caveat to its exercise. “There is a major assumption here: Taiwan must resist and not capitulate. If Taiwan surrenders before US forces can be brought to bear, the rest is futile.

Here too, Washington’s strategic ambiguity plays a critical and negative role. A few years ago, a senior Taiwanese navy officer told a security conference in Washington that since Taiwan could neither defeat a Chinese attack nor match China’s military spending, without the guarantee of direct US intervention, it should carefully consider its options.

A recommendation from CSIS would partially address this concern: “Taiwan must start the war with everything it needs. Moreover, delays and half measures on the part of the United States would make defense more difficult, increase American losses, allow China to create a stronger position and increase the risk of escalation.

Decisive US action is also required, the report says, if deterrence fails. “[I]n wartime, if the United States decides to defend Taiwan, American forces must quickly engage in direct combat. … [If] China believes that the United States would be unwilling to bear the high costs of defending Taiwan, so China might risk an invasion.

The same reasoning applies once a war begins: if China thinks the United States would be unwilling to bear the even greater costs of an escalation, it could risk escalating or at least threatening to do.

Here, the report strays when it recommends, “Don’t plan to hit the continent. The national command authority could refuse authorization because of the serious risks of escalation with a nuclear power.

But “serious escalation risks” work both ways. China would have at least as much to lose, probably more, including “destabilizing[d] Rule of the Chinese Communist Party.

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Although the report states, “There is no ‘Ukrainian model’ for Taiwan,” this recommendation would replicate President Biden’s initial mistake before the invasion, shouldering all fear of the United States. escalation and the obligation to avoid it. Biden assured Putin of Russian immunity, not only from US action, but also from victimized Ukrainians. Even placing US forces in Ukraine – for example, to enforce a no-fly zone – “would be World War III”, he claimed.

The authorization of “privileged sanctuaries” in North Vietnam contributed to the disastrous outcome of this war. Washington must ensure that Beijing understands that a war with Taiwan means a war with the United States and its allies. It would also mean immediate international recognition of Taiwan’s independence. A public declaration of this American and Allied resolve would help avoid a “Pyrrhic victory” where the losses outweigh the gains. As CSIS says, “it is better to deter war in the first place”.

Joseph Bosco was China Country Director for the Secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and Asia-Pacific Director of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief from 2009 to 2010. He served in the Pentagon when Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia and was involved in the Department of Defense. discussions on the American response. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA.

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