Random Rules: Part II – Ink

The analysis appears in Critical State, Inkstick Media and The World’s weekly newsletter. Subscribe here.

The Rebel Alliance can speak for itself, and the Rebellion is pure enough to hold a popular Rebel front together. But in the chaos of real life, the chaos of insurgency is a holding force, with ideological divisions separating factions that are supposed to be natural allies.

exist Acquaintance and difference? Ideological Polarization and Intrajihadist Competition in the Syrian Civil War, Regine Schwab examines one faction in the Syrian war, Ahrar al-Sham, and what tactics it uses to manage alliances among other rebel factions. While violence is certainly a tactic that rebel groups can use against rival groups, it comes at a high cost. For example, munitions used against another rebel group cannot be used against a government that both groups are trying to overthrow. After all, ammunition is a scarce resource. Moreover, killing another rebel faction’s fighters also consumes stamina.

For those looking to fight the Assad government but without the tough rules and beliefs of ISIS, Ahrar al-Sham is a path to fighting.

Differentiation also has implications for other audiences, Schwab writes, such as local civilians, potential recruits and external supporters. Local civilians suffer from rebel infighting as they risk crossing lines or becoming deliberate targets. Therefore, they should prefer non-violent ways to manage conflict. When the ideological distance between groups is large, potential local and foreign recruits are more likely to choose their preferred group. While non-state external sponsors may prefer to support the most radical rebel channels, state sponsors often opt for more moderate options.

In Syria, ideological polarization has proven to be a valuable strategy for the Ahrar al-Sham movement, especially when ISIS has taken hold of extreme extremists. For those looking to fight the Assad government but without the tough rules and beliefs of ISIS, Ahrar al-Sham is a path to fighting.

In analyzing how groups occupy ideological space, Schwab proposes two axes: a territorial perspective and a sociopolitical perspective. Territories range from national territories, or those seeking to confine warfare to smaller geographic boundaries, to transnational territories, such as ISIS’ vision of Syria and Iraq, all under the same rule.

At the pragmatic end of the social scale, groups prefer to integrate with society and view fitna (civil unrest) as detrimental to their cause, Schwab writes. Therefore, they are willing to work with actors who do not share their beliefs. This is in stark contrast to purist groups, which define takfir broadly, or declare other Muslims infidels.

Ahrar al-Sham was able, especially in 2013-2014, to differentiate itself from ISIS by emphasizing its nationalist credentials and broader ideological umbrella. However, this is not a particularly benign vision, as al-Sham has often touted the Afghan Taliban as a model for his ideal plan. However, these same moves make it vulnerable to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, who was able to replace Ahrar al-Sham as the country’s main rebel force after the fall of ISIS.

Analyzing the puzzling case of Ahrar al-Sham being both a winner and a loser in intra-Syrian jihadist rivalry, this paper finds that ideological differences are used when military constraints or ideological similarities preclude violence against rivals , concluded Schwab.