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The author is Biosafety Policy Lead at the Center for Long-Term Resilience and a member of the Council on Strategic Risks
We need to take biosecurity seriously – and quickly. Biological hazards have changed dramatically in a short time and governments need to act, both at home and together.
Advances in biotechnology have potentially facilitated the creation or modification of deadly pathogens, lowering the barriers preventing adversarial states and extremist organizations from developing biological weapons. Referring to the 2018 novichok attack in Salisbury, the UK’s Integrated Review warned of a “realistic possibility” of terrorists launching a successful chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack by 2030.
Meanwhile, high-containment labs are proliferating around the world as life science research expands, increasing the likelihood of an accident involving dangerous pathogens. And as we have learned, natural epidemics could become future pandemics, even more transmissible or deadly than Covid-19.
Whether it’s malicious intent, human error, or the evolution of viruses, we now face a range of heightened threats. Biosecurity must keep the people responsible for protecting our security awake at night.
The United States has begun to recognize the risks. Late last year, the Pandemic Prevention Act was passed to strengthen the country’s preparedness. The bipartisan legislation promises to improve detection capabilities, strengthen supply chains and accelerate the development of medical countermeasures. Senator Patty Murray, champion of the legislation, told Congress that “we are taking action to never go through a crisis like this again.”
An Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy will be responsible for mitigating biological threats across the federal government. The new unit will implement the national biodefense strategy, which includes developing early warning capabilities and investing in emerging technologies to deter state and non-state actors from developing biological weapons. Signaling the scale of ambition, the strategy targets $88 billion in funding over five years.
In the UK, officials from the Cabinet Office’s National Security Secretariat are finalizing an update to the 2018 National Biosecurity Strategy. While this plan recognized the range of biohazards facing the country, it provided few details on implementation or resources. Without clear responsibility and sufficient funding, it is perhaps unsurprising that when the Covid-19 outbreak hit some 18 months later, the UK was not as well prepared as it would have been. had to be.
The new strategy is our best chance to remedy that. It should include an identifying implementation plan that will address each risk, with a timeline for delivery. And its liabilities must be properly funded. We live in times of financial strain, but the £376 billion cost of the pandemic in the UK shows the staggering consequences of a lack of investment. The recent national resilience framework is at least an encouraging sign that the government is beginning to recognize the imperative to defend against extreme risks.
Finally, the UK must act in concert with others around the world to counter the risk of biological threats from all sources. The UK is the world leader in metagenomic sequencing – this could offer the chance to detect new pathogens at the very start of an outbreak. We should pioneer the creation of an interconnected early warning system at home and, through astute diplomacy, lead the development of a global system to sound the alarm about potential pandemics.
With a new Cabinet facing so many challenges, ruthless prioritization is needed to protect the UK’s economic wellbeing and national security. Biosecurity must be up there – ensured by an ambitious strategy and a stubborn implementation of its recommendations.
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