What Ukraine’s Win, Lose or Draw Means for China – Asia Times

Beijing is preparing to boost its global influence as the war in Ukraine ends. But for Chinese President Xi Jinping, the question now is which scenario is most likely to play out, what role China can play and what each outcome means for China.

As the war continues, the strength of the Sino-Russian alliance will be tested like never before.Whether Russia wins or loses, or the conflict freezes because the war is pending, puts China in a dilemma, and China has been deliberately promoting its image peacemaker during conflict.

There are a variety of scenarios in which the war is most likely to be fought or ended.

Scenario 1 Ukraine wins

Russia’s defeat in Ukraine would send a powerful signal of the resilience of the West and the vulnerability of authoritarian aggressors. Such a development would clearly undermine a key narrative within the Chinese Communist Party, at least since the 2008/09 global economic crisis, that the West is in decline and that its competitors, especially China, Ascendant.

A victory for Western-backed Ukraine would put Xi in an especially uncomfortable position, challenging his favorite phrase East wind prevails Nothing has changed in a hundred years.

However, wars often end in chaotic ways. If Russia is defeated, a lot depends on the nature of the defeat. If failure means the departure not just of President Vladimir Putin but of his inner circle, the new Russian government could abandon relations with China and re-prioritize good relations with the West. relationship, which would deal a blow to Beijing.

Scenario 2 Russia wins

A Russian victory with Western support for Ukraine faltering would empower China. Beijing may try to take more risky actions, especially in its neighbourhood.

In such a scenario, Taiwan could face intense pressure from the Chinese military to force the United States, which has pledged to support Taiwan, to decide whether to mount a military response.

In addition, China’s stance on Europe will be firmer, enabling Beijing to successfully prevent European countries from siding with the United States globally and in East Asia.

Others believe that a weakened or defeated Russia could be an opportunity for China. For example, it could play a more active role in Central Asia, or force Moscow to accept further economic and financial dependence on China.

Scenario 3 Stalemate

It is entirely possible that the war will remain stalemate for some time. In some ways, this may suit China, as it can continue to benefit from cheap Russian goods.

Russia’s dependence on China has been growing since 2014, which will make Russia permanently dependent on China for raw materials. This has been the nightmare of Russian policymakers in the 1990s. But in this case, it might come true.

The frozen conflict scenarios allow Beijing to continue its so-called policy of neutrality while promoting its role as a peacemaker without having to make any hard choices.

China’s current position

China has tried to position itself as a peacemaker. The peace plan it announced in February was less a plan than a reaffirmation of existing positions.However, point 12 talks about providing assistance post-conflict reconstructionReminder 2019 China is Ukraine top trading partner.

Although China has a solid partnership with Russia, it is trying to position itself as a peacemaker in the event of Russia’s failure, so that it will be in a good position to reap the rewards of economic reconstruction in Ukraine.happiness recent calls A meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky seemed to suggest that.

While the peace plan lacks details, it symbolizes China’s increasingly active stance in global affairs.pay attention to its high level of contribution Among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, UN peacekeeping Troops and financial contributions,and its engagement in africa and the middle east.

This all forms part of Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative, which aims to expand China’s diplomatic scopeto uphold multilateralism and the role of the United Nations, while rejecting Western ideas of a liberal Washington-based international order.

challenge

The challenges for Xi include how to combine China’s support for Russia’s interpretation of the global order with China’s principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty. Strategically, tangible Chinese support for Russia could bring the United States and European states closer together, strengthening transatlantic solidarity, an outcome Beijing has tried to avoid for the past two decades.

In the short term, Beijing is taking advantage of sanctioned Russia By benefiting from cheap Russian goods. Chinese companies have seized emerging opportunities in the Russian market.But the continuation of the war means the disruption of global supply chains, including transport food and fertilizer China relies heavily on it.

The impact of the war on China’s East Asia policy remains unclear. The Russian invasion has diverted U.S. resources away from the Asia-Pacific. But Beijing’s threat to Taiwan has become more acute in light of developments in Ukraine.

The United States responded by mobilizing its Asian Alliance Network and increase the importance of groups of countries that cooperate in security, such as quadrilateral (Australia, India, Japan and the United States) or victim (Australia, UK and US). Taiwan’s government has also stepped up efforts to strengthen the island’s defenses.

Like Russia, China sees Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a proxy war against the West, especially the United States. Russia’s victory or defeat in the war is not just a Russian problem, but may represent a victory or defeat for the United States. liberal international order.

The bottom line for Beijing, however, is to avoid a total Russian defeat over Ukraine. The role of the mediator is one way of preventing this development. If that is unsuccessful, Beijing may decide to step up its support for Moscow, from financial aid to arms deliveries.

Natasha CoulterSenior Lecturer in International Peace and Security, King’s College London and Marcin KaczmarskiLecturer in Security Studies, University of Glasgow

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