[ad_1]
In 2007, President Putin gave a powerful speech to the Munich Security Conference effectively saying, “Watch out – Russia is coming back.” His threat to revive Moscow’s influence across Slavic Europe was ignored, and a year later he proved true to his word and invaded Georgia.
Here we are 16 years later — still without a coherent Russian strategy, dithering as Russia prepares for a massive spring offensive in Ukraine.
It all boils down to the perplexing and infuriating predicament of tanks in Europe. It’s not about how many might head Ukraine’s way, but — in some countries — whether they should be sent at all.
Despite repeated declarations from Western capitals that “we stand by Ukraine,” President Zelensky has every right to feel abandoned.
In fact, all of this is nothing new. During this existential battle between dictatorship and democracy, between good and evil, the West has proved, at best, half-hearted. Providing enough weapons to prevent Ukraine from defeat, but as proved by the Rammstein disaster, offensive equipment was insufficient to enable Ukraine to win.
This condemns both Ukraine and ourselves to a protracted conflict, a possible stalemate and, at worst, a strategic defeat.
Once NATO declared at the start of the conflict that it would not formally respond to or intervene in an illegal Russian invasion, it gave Putin license to act with impunity and increase the level of risk he could take – virtually unchallenged – on the battlefield. She even gave him space to fully regroup after a hopeless initial invasion.
The 1,000-mile battle line had changed little in months. The danger is that if Ukraine cannot break the impasse soon, and face Russia’s expected spring offensive, the voices calling for talks will grow, leaving Ukraine weak and vulnerable to attack in the coming years, and many Ukrainian citizens and soldiers needlessly killed and maimed. cities and on the front lines.
This highlight of the ground war in Ukraine offers key lessons for Britain. First, I showed how the use of modern drones, long-range missiles, real-time satellite imagery, and electronic warfare contribute to range combat effectiveness.
We can now see that the penchant for the aerospace, electronic and naval fields has left the British Army very young and outdated. A soon-to-be-updated Integrated Review should address this.
Secondly, the wake-up call was – contrary to first appearances when the war began – the tank was still very important.
Now we can say with confidence that Western tanks are significantly superior to the old Soviet ones. Its ability to penetrate enemy defenses, capture territory, fight by night, and shoot accurately on the move will likely win the war. This trauma is as important today as it was in achieving victory in 1918.
While the UK has done a good job of pushing the envelope in the quality and quantity of military support sent by the timid West, we can now clearly see that a squadron of Challenger II tanks alone is not enough to change the course of this war. Indeed, our ground war capacity including tanks, armored personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles is in tatters.
In short: Our tanks are over 20 years old, and will soon be reduced to 148 from 900 a decade ago. Our Warrior armored fighting vehicles are over 26 years old. Even worse, the Warrior has been replaced by a German-made Boxer; Wheeled, untracked, no-turret vehicle. Our Scimitar Reconnaissance Vehicle is over 50 years old. It was supposed to be replaced by Ajax three years ago, but a series of procurement problems mean it’s unclear if this will continue.
If tanks are the answer to defeating our most dangerous adversary, we need more modern armor to make the British Army a viable fighting force of the future, its weapons effective for British soldiers or for foreign soldiers. It is heavy metal on the ground in Europe that will stop Putin’s westward expansion, and not just heavy metal on the high seas, in space or in the sky.
Ultimately, the penny should fall on the house and aboard in three ways, recognizing these three basic truths:
First, today’s conflict is not just about Ukraine, but Russia is exploiting a risk-averse West to enable Putin’s 16-year-old mission to restore Moscow’s Soviet-era influence.
Second, we need strong and secure allies. Whatever Germany’s final decision on their Leopard 2 tanks, they risk permanent damage to their reputation among NATO members by restricting other Leopard-using nations from donating these tanks to Ukraine. Where might this leave us in the future with the German-made boxer that is supposed to replace our warrior? Will Berlin put restrictions on how it can be published?
Third, there is a troubling lack of international leadership on how to collectively respond. What is our goal in this struggle other than to win hands and hope for the best? This is no time for strategic ambiguity, let alone debates about tanks.
This spring will witness a decisive crisis on the battlefield. The West is in danger of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.
RT. presence. Tobias Ellwood MP is the Chairman of the Defense Select Committee. Colonel (ret) Hamish de Bretton Gordon is a former UK and NATO CBRN forces commander.
|
Sources 2/ https://news.google.com/__i/rss/rd/articles/CBMiUWh0dHBzOi8vd3d3LnRlbGVncmFwaC5jby51ay9uZXdzLzIwMjMvMDEvMjQvYnJpdGFpbi1uZWVkcy1uZXctdGFua3MtZGVmZWF0LXB1dGluL9IBAA?oc=5 The mention sources can contact us to remove/changing this article |
[ad_2]