Reversing Responsibility: How the Pentagon Lost Afghanistan

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How could the Afghan security forces collapse after $ 83 billion was spent on training and equipping them? In recent days, the Taliban have invaded major Afghan cities such as Herat, Kandahar and Lashkar Gah, sometimes taking over Afghan security officials without a blow. Now the Taliban are walking in the Humvees, and US-trained Afghan soldiers have fled or joined the enemy. Kabul became Saigon around 1975, with desperate Afghans running alongside diplomatic convoys on their way to the airport, begging those inside to save them. Security conditions have deteriorated to such an extent that President Biden’s administrationJoe BidenBiden to announce booster injections for most fully vaccinated Americans: reports Afghanistan falling into chaos: five takeaways, Trump ally Adam Laxalt drops off to challenge Cortez Masto in Nevada PLUS sends 3,000 additional troops to evacuate Americans from the embassy. We might not see the Hueys land on rooftops, but we will see the Chinooks land in American complexes. As they say in the army, the situation is FUBAR.

It has become a worrying theme in American foreign policy. The United States lavished $ 26 billion on Iraqi security forces, only to see them flee at the sight of ISIS’s black flags, throwing down their weapons and ripping off their uniforms. For Syria, Congress approved $ 500 million to train and equip around 5,000 anti-ISIS fighters, but only had four or five to show for its efforts, according to Lloyd AustinLloyd AustinAfghanistan is falling into chaos: five takeaways Overnight Defense: Biden defends exit, blames Afghan leadership for chaos | US sends 1,000 additional troops to Kabul as airport chaos reigns | Taliban takeover scrambles US evacuation efforts US sends 1,000 more troops to Kabul as chaos reigns at MORE airport, general in charge then head of US central command and today the Secretary of Defense. Other US-sponsored militias simply turned over all their US weapons and ammunition to terrorists. The worst: the militias armed by the Pentagon fought those armed by the CIA.

The Afghanistan-pointing nightclub has begun. Usually, American policymakers blame the interns. After ISIS took control of Mosul, Iraq, in 2015, then Defense Secretary Ash Carter said Iraqi forces were unwilling to fight. Now others will say: this is Afghanistan, what did you expect?

It’s easy to lay the blame, but it ignores the obvious: The Department of Defense (DOD) is absolutely horrible at raising native fighting forces. Ten years in three countries with the same result is a model. Kabul is just the latest data point, and our incredible lack of preparation is proof of that. Strong confirmation bias and delusional thinking have long plagued US military commanders on the ground and policymakers at home, including President Bidens’ assurance in July that there will be no circumstance where you will see people. be lifted from the roof of an embassy. The week is still young.

But the problem is deeper. The U.S. military still lacks a comprehensive field manual and doctrine on how to obtain comprehensive assistance from the security forces, even though this has been central to our exit strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan during years. Why? Because our military identity is about assault, not occupation, and the formation of foreign troops smacks of occupation. We prefer to blow up the enemy.

Other rookie mistakes include mirror imaging the solution. Rather than tailoring an army to the unique needs and culture of Afghanistan, the Pentagon simply copied and pasted American models on Afghan forces, then was surprised to find that they did not survive the first one. contact with the enemy.

Despite the dismal record, the United States has succeeded in Colombia, the Philippines and Liberia under circumstances as bad as or worse than in Afghanistan. These countries succeeded not because they were more willing to fight against a cheap concept, but because these programs were more effective. I know this because I helped lead the effort to raise a new army for Liberia after its brutal 14 year civil war, and what we have done is nothing like the follies in Iraq and Afghanistan. You can read the details here, but here are some differences:

First of all, the successful missions of assistance to the security forces were all secondary spectacles within the Ministry of Defense. None of these countries were prominent in U.S. national security circles and, therefore, did not receive help from ambitious policymakers, lawmakers, and generals who had no knowledge of the raising of foreign armies. Instead, only experts ran the show and it paid off. For example, US Army Special Forces specialize in mobilizing foreign combat forces. Before the Soldiers earn the coveted Green Beret, they must pass a grueling four-week exercise called Robin Sage at Fort Bragg, where they must train alien forces in a hostile environment. When left alone, the pros can get the job done.

Second, technical solutions alone will fail, but this is how most view assistance to security forces: training and equipment. All of this results in better dressed soldiers who shoot straighter. It doesn’t provide leadership, a warrior ethic, a defense ministry, good strategy, a culture of merit over cronyism, and so on. The heart of a professional fighting force is upholding the rule of law and promoting constitutional allegiance to a leader or political party. Training and equipment alone will never do it.

Third, assisting the security forces is a deeply political process that must be accomplished in partnership with the reformed country. Security institutions are de facto institutions of power in conflict-affected countries such as Afghanistan, and it is dangerous to alter their balance with the assistance of security forces. The risks of rejection (read: war), retaliation, sabotage, co-option and corruption are ubiquitous but overlooked by American planners, who have a train and gear mentality.

Fourth, conduct a human rights check of all security force candidates, which is not only a good idea but also US law (22 US Code 2378d). We never would have dreamed of putting cops on our streets or soldiers in our army without a background check, but this is what we have been doing every day in Iraq and Afghanistan. Why are we now surprised that they are corrupt and weak forces? Some trainers say human rights verification is too difficult in failed states that have scarce or unreliable public records to verify, and therefore can be ignored. However, there are methods of control in these circumstances. We just chose to ignore them.

There are also other lessons:

Strategy, force structure and doctrine must reflect the needs of the country, not a job of copying and pasting ill-suited American models; A defense-oriented force posture with limited force projection capability will not threaten neighbors, creating a security dilemma; the size of a force must be limited by the government’s ability to pay salaries, as unpaid soldiers are a greater threat than invading neighbors; Artillery, armor, intelligence, fighter jets and special operations forces should be limited, as they can be operated by national leaders for personal gain. It is safer to have affordable and sustainable basic motorized infantry; smaller, well-trained volunteer forces are preferable to massive armed forces. Quality is greater than quantity, as Iraqi and Afghan forces have demonstrated; Literacy is important. You may need to mainstream literacy at all levels, starting with basic training.

The Afghan army is a symbol of our strategic failure, and it’s hard to watch. It’s easy to blame Biden for the disaster, but the problem dates back 20 years: Our exit strategy relies on competent foreign forces to rise up as we back out, but we don’t know how to create them. This is not a Biden issue but a US national security imperative. Afghanistan is our third strike, after Iraq and Syria. It is time we took this mission seriously before we are tested again, and no one should assume that training foreign forces will not be part of the great power competition. The good news is that we already know what to do if we listen to those who have successfully accomplished it.

Sean McFate is the author of five books, including The New Rules of War: How America Can Win Against Russia, China, and Other Threats (2019). He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Atlantic Council, Professor at Georgetown University, and Advisor at the Center for Technology and Global Affairs at the University of Oxford. He served in the US Army 82nd Airborne. Follow him on Twitter @seanmcfate.

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