The problem with a Kremlin critic’s call for support for Wagner’s mutiny

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The mutiny of the leader of the Wagner mercenary group Yevgeny Prigozhin against the Russian army came as a shock to much of the world, but it was not necessarily a surprise. Prigozhin has long been seen as a volatile and uncontrollable asset in Putin’s ongoing conflict with Ukraine.

The Russian opposition has regularly criticized Wagner’s actions, and those of his leader, over the past year and a half. However, the quick events of the weekend caused a shift in opinion among opposition politicians and political analysts who previously anticipated Prigozhin’s potential to disrupt the country through armed violence.

Many opposition politicians and political scientists had predicted that Prigozhin would be the element of Putin’s Russia that would trigger major structural change, most likely with the use of armed violence. Yet as soon as this scenario became a real prospect, with Wagner’s forces controlling a military command center in the south and heading for Moscow on Saturday, many liberal-leaning Russian politicians appeared to take a cautious approach to events. which took place.

A widely recognized member of Russia’s opposition spoke more concretely – and perhaps not in the way most would have anticipated. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the exiled Kremlin critic, posted a tweet in which he practically supported Prigozhin’s so-called “justice march”.

“Strange as it may sound, I think anti-war Russians should support Prigozhin right now. He is not our ally, and this support will be very temporary and conditional, but his march is a blow to Putin’s legitimacy, and anything that fractures the regime is good,” Khodorkovsky tweeted.

He justified his position by saying that Prigozhin echoed the very ideas that the Russian anti-war movement has espoused since February 24, 2022. On the surface level, this may seem like a logical conclusion from Khodorkovsky – yet there has a number of errors in its statements.

The first of these inconsistencies is the stance Khodorkovsky had taken towards Prigozhin over the past year and a half, which oscillated between contempt and disgust. Of course, people are capable of changing their minds when it is proven that their initial beliefs were wrong. However, Prigozhin did next to nothing to refute Khodorkovsky’s initial opinion of him. Moreover, the Wagner leader has been known in the past to use viewpoints more closely associated with the Russian opposition for his own gain. Prior to announcing this weekend’s ‘march’, its use of key opposition talking points was widely seen as trolling.

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What changed? Does the mere fact that Prigozhin is embarking on an insurrection suddenly prove that he is no longer a stranger to the anti-Putin opposition? It is worth recalling that Prigozhin has so far not said anything resembling a direct criticism of the Russian President.

Second, it is clear that Khodorkovsky spoke too soon. His tweet may have been heavily influenced by his author’s emotional reaction to current events. But there’s no reason why Khodorkovsky’s message didn’t wait until the situation was clearer. The main problem is that Khodorkovsky seems to be trying to align himself with a revolutionary movement, positioning himself to play a role in shaping Russia’s future decision-making process. Whether Prigozhin has succeeded in seizing power or a democratic government has emerged, Khodorkovsky seeks to present himself as someone who supported the “initial rebellion”.

Unless there is something we don’t know (and it’s highly doubtful there is), Prigozhin has no obligation to Khodorkovsky, making it highly unlikely that the critic’s support for the Kremlin would have been rewarded if the “march” had succeeded. Khodorkovsky is exceptionally intelligent and perhaps he could have foreseen that Prigozhin’s enterprise was doomed. Yet his willingness to support an armed revolt in Russia was intended to earn him additional popularity points among anti-Putinists who want to achieve regime change via armed rebellion.

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The third point is not so much an error in Khodorkovsky’s statement as a projection of the future of his platform. Every revolution of the past 200 years has had a very similar structure: a politicized, revolutionary-minded minority appeals to the help of the officials of the current regime, offering minimal or no accountability for their actions. The key aspect here is the direction of this alliance. The civil servants of the current regime associate themselves with the revolutionaries, and not the other way around. This pattern has endured due to the gradual build-up of a following by the revolutionary minority, which undermines the existing regime. Eventually, the regime’s elites realize that their own preservation depends on supporting the rebellion.

Khodorkovsky’s support for Prigozhin breaks this pattern. Prigozhin was one who advocated action against the current order while being part of that very order. This implies that Khodorkovsky, despite previously calling for Putin’s removal, recognizes that the revolutionary movement he represents is no longer effectively destabilizing the situation in Russia to the point where elites would join the opposition. Instead, Khodorkovsky suggests the opposition should align themselves with the elite.

Finally, Khodorkovsky’s position raises concerns about supporting a man known for his cruelty and lack of moral integrity. Prigozhin authorized the execution by sledgehammer of a deserter who had voluntarily surrendered to the Ukrainian army. Khodorkovsky’s position aligns with a utilitarian perspective that views actions as morally right depending on their context. This suggests that by creating circumstances where almost anything could be labeled as morally right, one can justify one’s actions every time. While Khodorkovsky does not absolve Prigozhin of wrongdoing, he does suggest that his followers should embrace this utilitarian view, at least temporarily. There is only one thing to say in such cases: there is no future for those who voluntarily ally themselves with murderers. A potential civil war, if it were to occur, would likely result in significant bloodshed. Russia’s future leaders must be individuals who feel emotional and mental anguish over decisions that could result in even one death, even if they think it serves the greater good.

Khodorkovsky’s support for Prigozhin’s “march of justice” raises significant concerns and invites scrutiny. While the reactions of the Russian opposition to the events of this weekend differ, Khodorkovsky’s position appears to be motivated by opportunism, as he seeks to secure influence within a revolutionary movement that could shape the future of Russia. Moreover, his endorsement of Prigozhin contradicts historical patterns of regime change and poses ethical dilemmas.

As the situation continues to evolve, it is vital to critically analyze the motivations and implications of such alliances, especially now that it seems the revolution has been delayed.

Since Prigozhin’s withdrawal, Khodorkovsky’s position has become more concrete. He envisions that the only rebellion capable of overthrowing Putin’s regime is one that uses force. Yet he suggests that those with guns in their hands should somehow not be given power. It remains to be seen how we achieve this.

Opinions expressed in opinion pieces do not necessarily reflect the position of The Moscow Times.

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