Column: As the US leaves Afghanistan, the blame game begins

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For the second time in 50 years, the American public is presented with images of Americans desperately fleeing the hostile takeover of an “allied” country by an opponent of the government. As happened with the “Saigon Moment of 1975”, today’s disaster has spawned a blame game for responsibility, most supporters. Most politicians and their supporters will blame the other party’s leadership, but after 20 years of bipartisan leadership on the war effort, this should fall on deaf ears.

America lost Afghanistan for the same reason that the Soviet Union lost; he attempted to impose centralized governance on a diverse population that passionately defends local sovereignty. Both governments have relied on a narrow band of selfish elites to function. The American experience differed only by basing it on democratic rather than Marxist-Leninist principles. The Afghan kings limited their role to external relations and the arbitration of disputes between internal groups. America’s allies against the Taliban have joined in this fact to regain their local autonomy. The centralization that followed triggered a shifting array of political alliances and opposition along community lines that precluded the nationwide membership required to maintain a post-American presence. As happened in 1989, the elites will take their plundered wealth and flee.

This reality will not prevent the continuation of the blame game. Those who seek favor with the political elites or to bolster their ideological credibility will blame the military. Military supporters will note that the military won battles and kept the Taliban at bay for 20 years.

Sadly, as America should have learned from Vietnam and its own American Revolution, who wins the battles doesn’t matter. Civil wars over national governance are won politically. The military is a facilitator of this process but, unless there is a political solution or an unlimited will to support war, not the determinant. Moreover, when an army collapses as quickly as that of Afghanistan, the reasons tend to be complex but are rooted in political failure. For example, telling unpaid troops to buy their own food does not inspire trust or loyalty. In fact, they tend to quickly get to who will feed them.

Blame runs across America’s political spectrum. The success of counterinsurgency has always been achieved through political-economic action and good governance. The Taliban are tough but consistent and currently uncorrupted. America’s Afghan political arrangements focused on issues important to American constituencies while ignoring what mattered to most Afghans. The United States had the will to fight but never forced its Afghan client elites to stamp out judicial and police corruption, making the Taliban’s harsh but predictable and fair jurisprudence appear. The Afghan army fought well when alongside or advised by US troops who made sure they received vital supplies. Our departure left their support to corrupt Afghan officials. The results were inevitable.

The lessons of American voters are clear. First, nation building is more than a military operation. Voters must question their leaders’ assumptions about all future regime change interventions. For these to work, political and economic arrangements matter as much as those for security. They are intertwined. Reject any official statement that ignores this reality or promises “no boots on the pitch”. The removal of a government creates a power vacuum that violent actors will exploit. Deploy security or accept the results (eg Libya).

However, forcing an American vision of centralized government creates a long-term commitment that includes security (eg, military forces). Nation building is neither quick nor cheap, even under ideal circumstances. America should only undertake it if its vital national interests are at stake, if the goals are realistic, clearly stated, and if the resources necessary to achieve them are presented honestly and fully committed. Many people have died in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya because our leaders did not do so before engaging our youth and the youth of our allies in war.

Carl O. Schuster, a resident of Honolulu, is a retired sea captain and former director of operations at the Joint Intelligence Center of US Pacific Command.

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